The search was unsuccessful. And the record is replete with evidence that Williams knew precisely what he was doing when he guided police to the body.
Cf. The court held, "that it is the government which bears a heavy burden . ยง 2254(d) in making its findings of fact in this case. This prompted brief comments by counsel for both parties. there is not even a small risk that the waiver will be involuntary.
When Williams placed the bundle in the front seat of his car, the boy "saw two legs in it and they were skinny and white." The Court of Appeals suspended the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus for 60 days to allow an opportunity for a new trial, and further suspended its issuance pending disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court.
In fact, Captain, whether he was a mental patient or not, you were trying to get all the information you could before he got to his lawyer, weren't you? The circumstances of this case are thus constitutionally indistinguishable from those presented in Massiah v. United States, supra. While he was free on bail a federal agent succeeded by surreptitious means in listening to incriminating statements made by him. BURGER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 430 U. S. 415. Tr. The Exclusionary Rule Should Not be Applied. Only recently, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 412 U. S. 238 n. 25 (1973), the Court analyzed the distinction between a voluntary act and the waiver of a right; there, MR. JUSTICE STEWART stated for the Court: "[T]he question whether a person has acted 'voluntarily' is quite distinct from the question whether he has 'waived' a trial right. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 422 U. S. 610-612 (1975) (concurring opinion). The District Court and the Court of Appeals were also correct in their understanding of the proper standard to be applied in determining the question of waiver as a matter of federal constitutional law -- that it was incumbent upon the State to prove "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Williams would thereby be protected by the attorney-client privilege from incriminating himself by directly demonstrating his knowledge of the body's location, and the unfortunate Powers child could be given a "Christian burial.". Williams knew of that agreement and, particularly in view of his consistent reliance on counsel, there is no basis for concluding that he disavowed it. . This defendant is permitted to attack his conviction collaterally although he conceded at the trial, and does not now deny, that he had robbed the savings and loan association, and although the evidence makes absolutely clear that he knew what he was doing. Such waiver, even if not express, [Footnote 4/5] was plainly shown here. Post at 430 U. S. 419. One familiar example of this Court's unwillingness to apply the prophylactic exclusionary rule beyond its natural scope is the requirement that evidence seized in violation of the rights of another person may not be challenged by a defendant whose own rights were not invaded. Similarly, in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 397 U. S. 766 (1970), we said that, since a guilty plea constituted a waiver of a host of constitutional rights, "it must be an intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.'" So, too, in the Sixth Amendment sphere, failure to have counsel in a pretrial setting should not lead to the "knee-Jerk" suppression of relevant and reliable evidence. Without further reviewing the circumstances of the trip, I would say it is clear there was no interrogation. In its Fourth Amendment context, we have now recognized that the exclusionary rule is in no sense a personal constitutional right, but a judicially conceived remedial device designed to safeguard and effectuate guaranteed legal rights generally. against him before the start of the car ride, and the officer This is a far cry from Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964). ", "Q. In the face of all this, the Court now holds that, because Williams was prompted by the detective's statement -- not interrogation, but a statement -- the jury must not be told how the police found the body. . Respondent then petitioned for habeas corpus in Federal District Court, which held that the evidence in question had been wrongly admitted at respondent's trial on the ground, inter alia, that he had been denied his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, and further ruled that he had not waived that right.
at 175-176, and were reviewed and approved by the Court of Appeals, which expressly held that "the District Court correctly applied 28 U.S.C. their counterparts in Des Moines to inform them that Williams had surrendered. The subject of the victim's clothing had never been broached by the police nor suggested by anything the police had said.
At no time during the trip did Williams express a willingness to be interrogated in the absence of an attorney. The rigid prophylactic rule -- as the majority implicitly recognizes -- is designed solely to prevent involuntary waivers of the right against self-incrimination, and is not to be applied to a statement by a law enforcement officer accompanied by a request by the officer that the accused make no response followed by more than an hour of silence and an apparently spontaneous statement on a subject -- the victim's shoes -- not broached in the "speech."
Pp. A warrant had been issued for his arrest, he had been arraigned on that warrant before a judge in a Davenport courtroom, and he had been committed by the court to confinement in jail. There, too, a defendant sought release after his conviction had been affirmed on appeal. The opinion of the trial court denying Williams' motion to suppress is unreported. As a result of these conversations, it was agreed between McKnight and the Des Moines police officials that Detective Leaming and a fellow officer would drive to Davenport to pick up Williams, that they would bring him directly back to Des Moines, and that they would not question him during the trip. The Court then goes on to hold, in effect, that Williams could not change his mind until he reached Des Moines. It will be because Detective Leaming, knowing full well that he risked reversal of Williams' conviction, intentionally denied Williams the right of every American under the Sixth Amendment to have the protective shield of a lawyer between himself and the awesome power of the State. Men usually intend to do what they do, and there is nothing in the record to support the proposition that respondent's decision to talk was anything but an exercise of his own free will.