In some cases, proof of grotesque district shapes may, without more, provide convincing proof of unconstitutional gerrymandering.
Implicit in the plurality's opinion today is at least some use of simple proportionality as the standard for measuring the normal representational entitlements of a political party.
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526, 394 U. S. 534, n. 4 (1969).
The election results obviously are relevant to a showing of the effects required to prove a political gerrymandering claim under our view. Access to the mapmaking process was strictly limited. [Footnote 6] Because the 1982 elections indicated that the plan also had a discriminatory effect, in that the proportionate voting influence of Democratic voters had been adversely affected and because any scheme "which purposely inhibit[s] or prevent[s] proportional representation cannot be tolerated," id.
To the District Court majority, the results of the 1982 elections seemed "to support an argument that there is a built-in bias favoring the majority party, the Republicans, which instituted the reapportionment plan." Id. Indeed, there is good reason to think that political gerrymandering is a self-limiting enterprise. Traditionally, the determination of electoral districts within a State has been a matter left to the legislative branch of the state government. Furthermore, the Court fails to explain why a bipartisan gerrymander -- which is what was approved in Gaffney -- affects individuals any differently than a partisan gerrymander, which the Court makes vulnerable to constitutional challenge today. The plurality is prepared to tolerate.
[Footnote 13] In both contexts, the question is whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied. Because the most easily measured indicia of political power relate solely to winning and losing elections, there is a grave risk that the plurality's various attempts to qualify and condition the group right the Court has created will gradually pale in importance.
The plurality would reserve this question, but, however it is ultimately answered, anomalies will result. They influence all election outcomes in all sets of districts.
Districting itself represents a middle ground between winner-take-all statewide elections and proportional representation for political parties. The members of both Houses are elected from legislative districts, but, while all Senate members are elected from single-member districts, House members are elected from a mixture of single-member and multimember districts.
§ 1973.
The requirement of a threshold showing is derived from the peculiar characteristics of these political gerrymandering claims. 603 F. Supp.
Id. For constitutional purposes, the Democratic claim in this case, insofar as it challenges vel non the legality of the multimember districts in certain counties, is like that of the Negroes in Whitcomb who failed to prove a racial gerrymander, for it boils down to a complaint that they failed to attract a majority of the voters in the challenged multimember districts. Specifically, whether its holding that because any apportionment scheme that purposely prevents proportional representation is unconstitutional, Democratic voters need only show that their proportionate voting influence has been adversely affected is the correct standard. Ante at 478 U. S. 130. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 462 U. S. 748 (1983) (concurring opinion).
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 328 U. S. 556 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
Indeed, quite aside from the anecdotal evidence, the shape of the House and Senate Districts, and the alleged disregard for political boundaries, we think it most likely that, whenever a legislature redistricts, those responsible for the legislation will know the likely political composition of the new districts, and will have a prediction as to whether a particular district is a safe one for a Democratic or Republican candidate or is a competitive district that either candidate might win.
Racial gerrymandering claims are justiciable because of the greater warrant the Equal Protection Clause gives the federal courts to intervene for protection against racial discrimination, and because of the stronger nexus between individual rights and group interests that is present in the case of a discrete and insular racial group.
The voting power of ghetto residents may have been 'cancelled out' as the District Court held, but this seems a mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls.
There is simply no clear stopping point to prevent the gradual evolution of a requirement of roughly proportional representation for every cohesive political group.
The plurality ignores the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a), by saying that it has not rejected any of the District Court's findings of fact, but has, "merely . Moreover, the Voting Rights Act, which to a large extent borrowed the effects test from White, explicitly declined to require any showing of discriminatory intent.
There are 100 members of the House of Representatives, and 50 members of the Senate. Plaintiffs apparently can meet the plurality's "threshold" only after a number of elections have been held under the challenged plan.
See also United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. at 430 U. S. 167; White v. Regester, supra, at 412 U. S. 765-766; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 150. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613 (1982); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965). at 412 U. S. 753, and its reluctance to undertake "the impossible task of extirpating politics from what are the essentially political processes of the sovereign States," id. 1479 (SD Ind.1984). [Footnote 2/7] It may be, as the plurality suggests, that.
Consequently, since we did not need to progress beyond that point, given our conclusion that no unconstitutional discriminatory effects were shown as a matter of law, we did not need to consider the District Court's factual findings on the other "factors" addressed by JUSTICE POWELL.
This characterization is not inconsistent with appellees' proof, and the District Court's finding, of statewide discriminatory effect resulting from "individual districting" that "exemplif[ies] this discrimination." . Consolidated with this suit in the proceedings below was another lawsuit, filed by the Indiana NAACP. These are familiar techniques of political gerrymandering. Thus, the individual's right to vote does not imply that political groups have a right to be free from discriminatory impairment of their group voting strength.
In holding that claim to be justiciable, the Court concluded that none of the identifying characteristics of a political question were present: "The question here is the consistency of state action with the Federal Constitution. Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race. Cf. As the District Court noted, the voter confusion generated by irrational district, boundaries is exacerbated in this case by the fact that the lines in the House plan were drawn independently of those in the Senate plan. See Grofman, 33 UCLA L.Rev. The mere lack of proportional representation did not unconstitutionally diminish the Democrats' electoral power. The fact that an individual lives here or, there is not a legitimate reason for overweighting or diluting the efficacy of his vote.". The one person, one vote principle had not yet been developed when Baker was decided. The multimember districts generally included the State's metropolitan areas.
I turn now to the District Court's findings with respect particularly to the gerrymandering of the House districts.
Prior to the 1982 election, this lawsuit was commenced by appellees, a group of Indiana Democrats who claimed that the plan constitutes a partisan political gerrymander designed to disenfranchise Democratic voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As the following map of the Senate districts in the Marion County area illustrates, the Senate plan also contains districts with unusual shapes. . None of these critical findings was found by the plurality today to be clearly erroneous. Although the population of Marion County, whose boundary lines form a square, was entitled to elect exactly seven Senators, 603 F. Supp.
In those cases, there was no population variation among the districts, and no one was precluded from voting. NAACP Plaintiffs' Exhibit 241 (Post-Tribune, Gary, Ind., Apr. Rather, the claim is that each political group in a State should have the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political group.
Appeal must be to an informed, civically militant electorate. For here the controlling command of Supreme Law is plain and unequivocal. Ante at 478 U. S. 135-136. Consequently, the only claims now before us are the political gerrymandering claims. Specifically, the Court holds that the fact that a vote dilution claim "is submitted by a political group, rather than a racial group, does not distinguish it in terms of justiciability."
The mere fact that there is no likely arithmetic presumption, such as the "one person, one vote" rule, in the present context does not compel a conclusion that the claims presented here are nonjusticiable. The District Court observed, and the parties do not disagree, that Indiana is a swing State. . By permitting voters readily to identify their voting districts and corresponding representatives, a nested plan can be expected to foster voter participation.
Unlock your Study Buddy for the 14 day, no risk, unlimited trial. Reynolds v. Sims identified several of the factors that should guide a legislature engaged in redistricting.
The question raised again today, 21 years later, is whether a court can apply the familiar "[j]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 369 U. S. 226, without being forced to make a nonjudicial policy determination or to resort to a standard that is not judicially manageable. Thus, we decline to overturn the District Court's finding of discriminatory intent as clearly erroneous. at 1494.
At one point, the plurality acknowledges that this formulation is "somewhat different" from any standard we have previously used to test an electoral plan against an equal protection challenge, ante at 478 U. S. 132, and also takes pains to say that its opinion here does not suggest any "alteration of the standards developed" for evaluating racial challenges, ante at 478 U. S. 132, n. 13; see ante at 478 U. S. 134, n. 14. The Equal Protection Clause guarantees citizens that their State will govern them impartially. The Republican Committee revealed its proposed redistricting plan two days before the end of the legislative session, and the Democrats hurriedly presented an alternative plan.
Since the essence of a gerrymandering claim is that the members of a political party have been denied their right to “fair and effective” representation, the claim cannot be tested solely by reference to “one person, one vote.” Rather, a number of other relevant factors must be considered. For "one person, one vote" to serve its intended purpose of implementing the constitutional mandate of fair and effective representation, therefore, consideration also must be given to other neutral factors. The most important of these factors are the shapes of voting districts and adherence to established political subdivision boundaries. at 1492. The redistricting process was conducted in secret.