The psychiatrist merely testified that he had interviewed petitioner. As the writ issues with respect to petitioner's death sentence on other grounds, we need not, and do not, address this claim.
The jury found that all three offenses had been committed while petitioner had been engaged in the commission of the offenses specified in the instruction, and imposed death sentences for murder, rape, and kidnapping with bodily injury.
The prosecutor did not claim to read these excerpts from an opinion by the Georgia Supreme Court, but merely attributed the excerpts to "one of our noted justices" and "a justice."
He felt that the death penalty would be affirmed by the Supreme Court. On Apr.
Before concluding this review, I will mention something not covered in Dr. Fay Stapleton Burnett’s fine book: the rise and fall of the Georgia Supreme Court’s repulsive judicial opinion in the Susan Eberhart case. There was, however, no rest for her… Every minute of torture seemed an hour to the crowd… A perceptible shudder passed through the spectators, who were all greatly affected. Petitioner filed the present federal habeas petition on May 15, 1985 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor read a passage from a 19th Century Georgia case, Eberhart v. ... 335-36, 240 S.E.2d 833, 840 (1977); Ruffin v. State, 243 Ga. 95, 252 S.E.2d 472, 479-80 (1979), but the Georgia court has generally considered the effect of the passage insufficient to warrant reversal of the sentences imposed.
The Georgia Supreme Court, on direct appeal, found that "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the jury selection process revealed no degree of actual prejudice." "[I]n order to be entitled to a declaratory judgment the plaintiff must show facts or circumstances whereby it is in a position of uncertainty or insecurity because of a dispute and of having to take some future action which is properly incident to its alleged right, and which future action without direction from the court might reasonably jeopardize its interest."
Born around 1835, both his parents died when he was an infant. The governor even claimed to have learned from “a reliable authority” that Susan Eberhart “was a vigorous, lusty, intelligent young woman;” that “[b]y her beauty and her passion, she completely bewildered [Enoch Spann] and held him in absolute control;” that “Spann was completely under her control, and a perfect slave to her passions;” and that Susan “was the willing incentive to the crime.”.
at 690, 104 S.Ct. denied, 476 U.S. 1153, 106 S.Ct.
Within days, Enoch Spann began making sexual advances toward Susan and engaging in wild talk with her about how he was going to kill his wife and marry Susan. His political career, it was said, ended with the drop of the trapdoor under Susan Eberhart’s feet. Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant with all cost taxed to the plaintiff.
"[I]n order to be entitled to a declaratory judgment the plaintiff must show facts or circumstances whereby it is in a position of uncertainty or insecurity because of a dispute and of having to take some future action which is properly incident to its alleged right, and which future action without direction from the court might reasonably jeopardize its interest.". Hardy filed this plea of double jeopardy which the trial court denied.
Also during its January, 1873, Term, the Georgia Supreme Court denies Enoch Spann a new trial, Spann v. State, 47 Ga. 553 (1873), and in another decision upholds a determination by the trial court that Spann has not become insane since his sentencing, Spann v. State, 47 Ga. 549 (1873).
Petitioner did not raise this claim until his state habeas proceedings.
28, Gov. Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Moreover, in response to a question by petitioner's counsel, the court explicitly affirmed the propriety of advising petitioner of his right to remain silent, remarking that this right "would supersede any right that the State would have." Susan Eberhart is one of only four white females executed in the history of Georgia; the other 11 executed females were black. She could barely read and write. One week before trial, aggravated sodomy was dropped from the indictment. The testimony was certainly false. Unigard issued the policy in question to John Zanes, providing coverage for a 1964 Falcon automobile, possession of which Zanes had given to his niece.
11, 1873, and Eberhart the following May 2. 1265, 59 L.Ed.2d 485 (1979). Id.
In particular, petitioner contends that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance and that he was improperly denied a change of venue.9 We find no fault with the district court's decision to dispose of these issues on the basis of the record of the state proceedings, the federal habeas petition, and the response.
McKay, is the most callous, inhumane pronouncement about the nature of justice ever to appear in a Georgia appellate decision. I close this review by urging both Georgians and non-Georgians to read The Hanging of Susan Eberhart.
Paula K. Smith, Asst. § 2254 (1988) with respect to the death sentence, but denied relief with respect to Presnell's convictions and remaining sentences. “The grave opens to receive me and I am ready to sink into its depths.”—19-year-old Susan Eberhart, May 2, 1873, one hour before her execution.
Smith waited as long as possible before announcing his predictable decision. People have had mercy on me at various times.
He faces a death sentence on the murder conviction, and prison sentences on the remaining convictions. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.
Above all, readers of her sobering book cannot but find themselves moved by the heart-sickening true story of the truly ill-fated Susan Eberhart, doomed to an early and terrible death—Susan Eberhart, the young woman whose execution was, in the words of a Georgia newspaper of the era, “a disgrace to the age, and a reproach to the State.”. While the Georgia Supreme Court did not address the question of whether petitioner had established facts sufficient to warrant the extraordinary finding of presumed, as opposed to actual, prejudice, the district court found that petitioner had failed to establish such facts. The Georgia Code of 1861 (which became effective on Jan. 1, 1863) abolished mandatory death sentences for persons convicted of murder in this state and authorized the trial judge to impose a life imprisonment sentence, instead of a death sentence, in two alternate situations: (1) “if the conviction is founded solely on circumstantial testimony,” or (2) “if the jury trying the traverse [i.e., the trial jury] shall so recommend.” The statute further provided that if the jury did recommend a life sentence, then such a sentence was mandatory. Get 2 points on providing a valid reason for the above
1386, 89 L.Ed.2d 610 (1986). ", The present case more closely resembles Drake, which, according to Bowen itself, "is easily distinguished from [Bowen ]." Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Atlanta, Ga., for respondents-appellants, cross-appellees. That is, if in its discretion it thought for any reason that mercy was appropriate, the jury was, under the statute, free to prevent the defendant from being punished by death.
Probable year of birth of Enoch Ferdinand Spann near Bainbridge, in Decatur County.
denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. A natural candidate for such an offense was the aggravated sodomy mentioned in the jury instructions. In contrast, the psychiatrist based his opinion that petitioner had no symptoms of insanity on his "experience as a psychiatrist [and his] examination of [petitioner].".
“I failed to find a single point on which to predicate a pardon or commutation,” he added.
Potts v. Kemp, 475 U.S. 1068, 106 S.Ct.
Once you create your profile, you will be able to: Claim the judgments where you have appeared by linking them directly to your profile and maintain a record of your body of work.
The United States Supreme Court's decision, however, had barred the use of forcible rape as a basis for the bodily injury component of the kidnapping offense in this case on federal constitutional grounds. The brief of plaintiff contends that only the bill of sale was stipulated in evidence.