The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev.
Neither is there any intimation here that the helicopter interfered with respondent's normal use of the greenhouse or of other parts of the curtilage.
Suppose, finally, that the FAA regulations remained unchanged, so that the police were undeniably "where they had a right to be." E. g., United States v. Knotts, Ronald M. Sinoway filed a brief for the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice et al. U.S. 745, 789
Begin typing to search, use arrow keys to navigate, use enter to select. 1. U.S. 57 (1986), controls this case. Id., at 215.
It is more curious still Nor is it conclusive that police helicopters may often fly at 400 feet.
.
This case originated with an anonymous tip to the Pasco County Sheriff's office that marijuana was being grown on respondent's property. U.S. 445, 447] Because the sides and roof of his greenhouse were left partially open, however, what was growing in the greenhouse was subject to viewing from the air. U.S. 445, 457] That the plurality does so with little analysis beyond its determination that the police complied with FAA regulations is particularly unfortunate. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Florida Supreme Court with a four-vote plurality, arguing that the accused did not have a reasonable expectation that the greenhouse was protected from aerial view, and thus that the helicopter surveillance did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. that the plurality relies to such an extent on the legality of the officer's act, when we have consistently refused to equate police violation of the law with infringement of the Fourth Amendment. U.S. 207
Florida Supreme Court reversed.
In Ciraolo, we likened observation from a plane traveling in "public navigable airspace" at 1,000 feet to observation by police "passing by a home on public thoroughfares." The court held that it did. Supreme Court of United States. As we observed: "The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares." She deviated from the plurality opinion in arguing that the frequency of public flight in the airspace was a necessary concern, and that the mere legality of such flights was insufficient to determine whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy: [I]t is not conclusive to observe, as the plurality does, that "[a]ny member of the public could legally have been flying over Riley's property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley's greenhouse."
A majority of the Court thus agrees that the fundamental inquiry is not whether the police were where they had a right to be under FAA regulations, but rather whether Riley's expectation of privacy was rendered illusory by the extent of
In these circumstances, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.[6]. It is a curious notion that the reach of the Fourth Amendment can be so largely defined by administrative regulations issued for purposes of flight safety. not with the individual defendant. 1659. Because there is reason to believe that there is considerable public use of airspace at altitudes of 400 feet and above, and because Riley introduced no evidence to the contrary before the Florida courts, I conclude that Riley's expectation that his curtilage was protected from naked-eye aerial observation from that altitude was not a reasonable one. [10], Justice Blackmun recognized that five of the nine justices (O'Connor and the four dissenters) had agreed that "the reasonableness of Riley's expectation [of privacy] depends, in large measure, on the frequency of non-police helicopter flights at an altitude of 450 feet."
If they do not take such precautions, they cannot reasonably expect privacy from public observation. White, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, "Whether surveillance of the interior of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard from the vantage point of a helicopter located 400 feet (120 m) above the greenhouse constitutes a 'search' for which a warrant is required under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, 12 of the Florida Constitution."
She deviated from the plurality opinion in arguing that the frequency of public flight in the airspace was a necessary concern, and that the mere legality of such flights was insufficient to determine whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy: [I]t is not conclusive to observe, as the plurality does, that "[a]ny member of the public could legally have been flying over Riley's property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley's greenhouse."
Footnote *
] The issue in Jones v. United States,
The vantage point he enjoyed was not one any citizen could readily share. Defendant's motion to suppress evidence granted by trial court; reversed. Reverse the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court suppressing the evidence. He wrote that "burdens of proof relevant to Fourth Amendment issues may be based on a judicial estimate of the probabilities involved. I agree, of course, that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public .
466 I concur in the judgment reversing the Supreme Court of Florida because I agree that police observation of the greenhouse in Riley's curtilage from a helicopter passing at an altitude of 400 feet did not violate an expectation of privacy "that society is prepared to recognize as `reasonable.' nice people," United States v. Rabinowitz, Aviation Administration, Census of U.S. Civil Aircraft, Calendar Year 1987, p. 12. You could also do it yourself at any point in time. Please try again. Discussion.
Our reasoning was that the home and its curtilage are not necessarily protected from inspection that involves no physical invasion.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. A warrant was obtained and marijuana was found in the greenhouse.
The State quite clearly has not carried this burden.
All rights reserved. A Florida county sheriff's office received an anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown on respondent's property. . The judgment of the Court, therefore, is to reverse outright on the Fourth Amendment issue. Defendant's motion to suppress evidence granted by trial court; reversed.
Notwithstanding the disclaimers of its final paragraph, the opinion relies almost exclusively on the fact that the police officer conducted his surveillance from a vantage point where, under applicable Federal Aviation Administration regulations, he had a legal right to be. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA Syllabus.
The reason why there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in an area that is exposed to the public is that little diminution in "the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens" will result from police surveillance of something that any passerby readily sees. is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."
U.S. 543, 548 389
[2] A deputy sheriff subsequently investigated the tip and went to Riley's mobile home.
She deviated from the plurality opinion in arguing that the frequency of public flight in the airspace was a necessary concern, and that the mere legality of such flights was insufficient to determine whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy: Nevertheless, O'Connor concurred with the plurality opinion because she thought the defendant still needed to show that public use of the relevant airspace was uncommon.
The simple inquiry whether the police officer had the legal right to be in the position from which he made his observations cannot suffice, for we cannot assume that Riley's curtilage was so open to the observations of passersby in the skies that he retained little privacy or personal security to be lost to police surveillance. After a search pursuant to a warrant obtained on the basis of these observations revealed marijuana growing in the greenhouse, respondent was charged with possession of that substance under Florida law. On certification to it by a lower state court, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the following question: "Whether surveillance of the interior of a partially covered greenhouse Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989)[1], was a United States Supreme Court decision which held that police officials do not need a warrant to observe an individual's property from public airspace.
[488 Marc H. Salton argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
U.S. 445, 452] I do not think the constitutional claim should fail simply because "there is reason to believe" that there is "considerable" public flying this close to earth or because Riley "introduced no evidence to the contrary before the Florida courts."
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the plurality has allowed its analysis of Riley's expectation of privacy to be colored by its distaste for the activity in which he was engaged.
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), was a United States Supreme Court decision which held that police officials do not need a warrant to observe an individual's property from public airspace.[1]. Riley could not reasonably Ante, at 451. Seizing on a reference in Ciraolo to the fact that the police officer was in a position "where he ha[d] a right to be," ibid., today's plurality professes to find this case indistinguishable because FAA regulations do not impose a minimum altitude requirement on helicopter traffic; thus, the officer in this case too made his observations from a vantage point where he had a right to be. Where in the Fourth Amendment or in our cases is there any warrant for imposing a requirement that the activity observed must be "intimate" in order to be protected by the Constitution? 16, 37 (1988). Decided January 23, 1989. Id., at 213.
With his naked eye, he was able to see through the openings in the roof and one or more of the open sides of the greenhouse and to identify what he thought was marijuana growing in the structure.
In this case, the prosecution did not meet this burden of proof, as JUSTICE BRENNAN notes. areas. ] Without actually stating that it makes any difference, the plurality also notes that "there is nothing in the record or before us to suggest" that helicopter traffic at the 400-foot level is so rare as to justify Riley's expectation of privacy.
U.S. 438, 466 U.S. 347, 361 The plurality undertakes no inquiry into whether low-level helicopter surveillance by the police of activities in an enclosed 2 U.S. 445, 451] White, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, "Whether surveillance of the interior of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard from the vantage point of a helicopter located 400 feet (120 m) above the greenhouse constitutes a 'search' for which a warrant is required under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, 12 of the Florida Constitution."
The absence of two roof panels allowed the deputy to see, with his naked eye, what appeared to be marijuana growing. the street if their view had been unobstructed.
There is no reasonable expectation that the contents of the respondent’s greenhouse were protected from public or official inspection from the air since he left its roof open.
And of course Katz v. United States, U.S. 445, 455] App., pp. [488 However, public use of altitudes lower than that - particularly public observations from helicopters circling over the curtilage of a home - may be sufficiently rare that police surveillance from such altitudes would violate reasonable expectations of privacy, despite compliance with FAA air safety regulations.
Riley was arrested for possession of marijuana under Florida law. A warrant ] What the plurality now states as a firm rule of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence appeared in Ciraolo, 511 So.2d 282 (1987). Footnote 3