Congress could nonetheless conclude that the type of abortion proscribed by the Act requires specific regulation because it implicates additional ethical and moral concerns that justify a special prohibition. 2d, at 1008–1009, 1017–1018; National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. The Act punishes “knowingly perform[ing]” a “partial-birth abortion.” §1531(a) (2000 ed., Supp. The Court appears, then, to contemplate another lawsuit by the initiators of the instant actions.
The medical profession, furthermore, may find different and less shocking methods to abort the fetus in the second trimester, thereby accommodating legislative demand. Third, because the doctor must perform an “overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills the partially delivered fetus,” §1531(b)(1)(B), the “overt act” must be separate from delivery. The doctor thus answered in the affirmative when asked whether he would “hold the fetus’ head on the internal side of the [cervix] in order to collapse the skull” and kill the fetus before it is born. Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts.
And, for the first time since Roe, the Court blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a woman’s health. .
(gender-based Social Security classification rejected because it rested on “archaic and overbroad generalizations” “such as assumptions as to [women’s] dependency” (internal quotation marks omitted)). of Oral Arg.
It cannot be said that the Act “vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of [law enforcement] to determine whether the [doctor] has satisfied [its provisions].” Kolender, supra, at 358 (invalidating a statute regulating loitering). Even after applying a deferential standard of review to Congress’ factual findings, the Court of Appeals determined “substantial disagreement exists in the medical community regarding whether” the procedures prohibited by the Act are ever necessary to preserve a woman’s health.
18 U. S. C. §1531(b)(1)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. A zero tolerance policy would strike down legitimate abortion regulations, like the present one, if some part of the medical community were disinclined to follow the proscription. Respondents likewise have failed to show that the Act should be invalidated on its face because it encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
Instead, the Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.9.
Here, by contrast, interpreting the Act so that it does not prohibit standard D&E is the most reasonable reading and understanding of its terms. Although we review congressional factfinding under a deferential standard, we do not in the circumstances here place dispositive weight on Congress’ findings. See Carhart, 331 F. Supp.
Following this Court’s Stenberg v. Carhart,
IV), instead of “ ‘delivering.
Pp.
In the usual intact D&E the fetus’ head lodges in the cervix, and dilation is insufficient to allow it to pass. Doctors who do not seek to obtain this serial dilation perform an intact D&E on far fewer occasions. See ibid. in No. The Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake. 2000). 2d, at 982, 1001. ibid.
In a hysterotomy, as in a cesarean section, the doctor removes the fetus by making an incision through the abdomen and uterine wall to gain access to the uterine cavity.
Though all three are implicated here, it is the third that requires the most extended discussion.
Thus, legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature. Congress found, among other things, that “[a] moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice of performing a partial-birth abortion … is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary and should be prohibited.” Id., at 767, ¶(1).
The Court envisions that in an as-applied challenge, “the nature of the medical risk can be better quantified and balanced.” Ibid. Whatever one’s views concerning the Casey joint opinion, it is evident a premise central to its conclusion—that the government has a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life—would be repudiated were the Court now to affirm the judgments of the Courts of Appeals. If a doctor’s intent at the outset is to perform a D&E in which the fetus would not be delivered to either of the Act’s anatomical landmarks, but the fetus nonetheless is delivered past one of those points, the requisite and prohibited scienter is not present. 492 U. S. 490,
2004) (“Congress arbitrarily relied upon the opinions of doctors who claimed to have no (or very little) recent and relevant experience with surgical abortions, and disregarded the views of doctors who had significant and relevant experience with those procedures.”), aff’d,413 F. 3d 791 (CA8 2005).
They considered D&E always to be a safe alternative.
52(a); Salve Regina College v. Russell,
The majority opinion did specifically state that it was valid under the Commerce Clause. Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp.
It defines “partial-birth abortion,” §1531(b)(1), as a procedure in which the doctor: “(A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the [mother’s] body … , or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the [mother’s] body … , for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus”; and “(B) performs the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills the fetus.”. One may anticipate that such a preenforcement challenge will be mounted swiftly, to ward off serious, sometimes irremediable harm, to women whose health would be endangered by the intact D&E prohibition. The Casey Court reaffirmed what it termed Roe’s three-part “essential holding”: First, a woman has the right to choose to have an abortion before fetal viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Taking care to speak plainly, the Casey Court restated and reaffirmed Roe’s essential holding. 368 U. S. 57, Carhart, 331 F. Supp. By allowing such concerns to carry the day and case, overriding fundamental rights, the Court dishonors our precedent.
See Stenberg, 530 U. S., at 930. 2d, at 809–810. 2d, at 1008–1009 (“[T]here was no evident consensus in the record that Congress compiled. The dual prohibitions of the Act, both of which are necessary for criminal liability, correspond with the steps generally undertaken during this type of procedure.
385 (2005) There is no evidence of an abortion trauma syndrome.”); American Psychological Association, Council Policy Manual: (N)(I)(3), Public Interest (1989) (declaring assertions about widespread severe negative psychological effects of abortion to be “without fact”).
The Court held that the legislation was constitutional, as the ban was both clear and narrow, and did not serve as an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to obtain an abortion. Once dead, moreover, the fetus’ body will soften, and its removal will be easier.
When standard medical options are available, mere convenience does not suffice to displace them; and if some procedures have different risks than others, it does not follow that the State is altogether barred from imposing reasonable regulations.
The Act, measured by its text in this facial attack, does not impose a “substantial obstacle” to late-term, but previability, abortions, as prohibited by the Casey plurality, 505 U. S., at 878.
2d, at 466, n. 22 (“Most of [the plaintiffs’] experts acknowledged that they do not describe to their patients what [the D&E and intact D&E] procedures entail in clear and precise terms”); see also id., at 479.
in No.