The Court no longer prohibits exclusion of uncertain, vacillating, or ambiguous prospective jurors. These juries will be unlikely to represent a fair cross section of the community, and their verdicts will thus be unlikely to reflect fairly the community's judgment whether a particular defendant has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be guilty and deserving of death. 843, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 102 S.Ct. Even if one were to accept the Court's redefinition of the proper standards for death-qualification, it would not follow that the Court's holding with respect to the applicability of § 2254(d) is correct. Though critical of the prosecutor's decision to fashion his questioning around the word "interfere," the court below did not base its decision on this divergence from the precise inquiry of Witherspoon's footnote 21.
"[A. Colby:] I am afraid personally but not—. 2224, 2231, 68 L.Ed.2d 724 (1981). Adams, supra, at 45, 49-50, 100 S.Ct., at 2526, 2528-2529.
. Keeton v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (CA 4 1984). Because the Court never acknowledges the constitutional rights Witherspoon was meant to protect, it need not explain why Witherspoon § protections are no longer needed. Home: Ron Fridell, Gideon v. Wainwright: The Right to Free Counsel (Tarrytown, NY: Marshall Cavendish, 2007). A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government. We had to transfer them to court, and many of them were released, but many of them came back to the system, and there were several hundred that had the opportunity to go back to court. Three important consequences flow from Witherspoon 's stringent standard for exclusion. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), by failing to contemporaneously object. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595-596, 98 S.Ct. Thus any juror who would consider the death penalty under some circumstances—who, in other words, would not automatically vote against it—could abide by the instructions and oath in Illinois at the time. "[Q]: Would it interfere with judging the guilt or innocence of the Defendant in this case? Justice STEVENS, dissenting in Patton v. Yount, supra, has persuasively demonstrated that "the question whether a juror has an opinion that disqualifies is a mixed one of law and fact," id., at 1052, 104 S.Ct., at 2899, because the question is " 'whether the nature and strength of the opinion formed are such as in law necessarily . Id., at 530, 95 S.Ct., at 697. Ante, at 438 (concurring in judgment). Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S., at 50, 100 S.Ct., at 2529. The finding is evident from the record. See generally Schnapper, Taking Witherspoon Seriously: The Search for Death-Qualified Jurors, 62 Texas L.Rev. 1578, 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 89 S.Ct. 1318, 1320, 79 L.Ed.2d 714 (1984) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), and because of what seemed to us as more general confusion surrounding the application of Witherspoon, we granted certiorari. § 2254. 2003. the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge," Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, 391 U.S., at 156, 88 S.Ct., at 1451, is particularly acute in the context of a capital case. More importantly, the label "dictum" does not begin to convey the status that the restrictions embodied in footnote 21 have achieved in this Court and state and federal courts over the last decade and a half.
In O'Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d, at 392 (Higginbotham, J., concurring specially), Judge Higginbotham artfully discusses those factors, in addition to the trial court's advantage of having seen and heard the juror, which dictate deference to the trial judge's decision under these circumstances. This is because determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. Id., at 372. Ante, at 432-434.
See ante, at 430-431, and n. 11, 434-435; ante, at 437-438 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). The judge's finding is therefore "presumed correct" absent anything in the record showing one of the reasons enumerated in the statute for avoiding the presumption. Since there are portions of the Court of Appeals' opinion that suggest that its result could be squared with Adams, however, we proceed to discuss another very important question in the administration of Witherspoon challenges—the degree of deference that a federal habeas court must pay to a state trial judge's determination of bias. 1770, 1776, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), the Court recognized that the voir dire practice of "death qualification"—the exclusion for cause, in capital cases, of jurors opposed to capital punishment can dangerously erode this "inestimable safeguard" by creating unrepresentative juries "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die."
Id., at 45, 100 S.Ct., at 2526. The record thus demonstrates that defense counsel wanted Kazmierczak to serve as a juror, but that she was properly excused.
Maxwell, supra, 398 U.S., at 264-265, 90 S.Ct., at 1580; Boulden, supra, 394 U.S., at 483-484, 89 S.Ct., at 1141-1142. But there is nothing talismanic about juror exclusion under Witherspoon merely because it involves capital sentencing juries. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157, 25 L.Ed.
We see no reason to disturb this essentially factual determination by the Court of Appeals. Much of this exegesis, however, is a latter-day version of a "fair cross section" theme barely adumbrated by that opinion. "Defense counsel did not object or attempt rehabilitation." Patton, supra, 467 U.S., at 1037, n. 12, 104 S.Ct., at 2892, n. 12. The court therefore ordered resentencing—not retrial—for Witt in accord with Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment requirements.8. Since the trial court's function was application of law to fact, the determination was subject to independent review. Anyone familiar with trial court practice knows that the court reporter is relied upon to furnish an accurate account of what is said in the courtroom.
1578, 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970), and Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 89 S.Ct.
These restrictions not only trace narrowly the compass of permissible exclusion but also allocate to the State the cost of unavoidable uncertainty with respect to whether a prospective juror with scruples about capital punishment should be excluded. Despite Witherspoon § limited holding, later opinions in this Court and the lower courts have referred to the language in footnote 21, or similar language in Witherspoon § footnote 9, as setting the standard for judging the proper exclusion of a juror opposed to capital punishment. That the Court would be willing to place the life of this capital defendant, and all others, in the hands of a skewed jury is unpardonable. unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.' Because the Court is not forthright about the extent to which today's decision departs from Witherspoon and its progeny, and because the Court does not even acknowledge the constitutional rights Witherspoon is meant to protect, a detailed exposition of Witherspoon v. Illinois is in order. How can we say the judge is wrong? that [she] would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment . In a Witherspoon case the convicted defendant challenges the exclusion of particular jurors.
Personal Interview Transcript Louie L. Wainwright, Director of Florida Department of Corrections, 1962-1987 "I didn’t realize how significant [the case] would be, but the former member of the Supreme Court was representing me in the Court [sic], and of course the reason I was named was because I was the agency head.The person ahead of me was named [case was originally Gideon v.
The law is stated in an opinion such as Adams; but the question in subsequent cases is whether a trial court finding that the standard was met is "fairly supported" by the "record .
On four separate occasions she affirmed that her beliefs would interfere with her sitting as a juror. Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154, 99 S.Ct.
." In such circumstances it does not make sense to require simply that a juror not "automatically" vote against the death penalty; whether or not a venireman might vote for death under certain personal standards, the State still may properly challenge that venireman if he refuses to follow the statutory scheme and truthfully answer the questions put by the trial judge. 1444, 1450-1451, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). This result debases the Sixth Amendment's jury guarantees. As Adams recognizes, making such judgments "is not an exact science, and the jurors . § 2254(d).7 Although the District Court relied on this section and accorded deference to the state trial judge's finding of bias, Witt v. Wainwright, No. 448 U.S., at 49-50, 100 S.Ct., at 2528-2529. § 2254, and therefore a federal reviewing court is required to accord any findings of the state courts on "factual issues" a "presumption of correctness" under 28 U.S.C. 448 U.S., at 45, 100 S.Ct., at 2526.
A defendant's established right to a jury that reflects the community's judgment about whether the evidence supporting conviction and execution for a particular crime crosses the "reasonable doubt" threshold has been made to disappear. . E.g., Patton v. Yount, supra; Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 104 S.Ct.
'THE COURT: Well, that's the question I have to have a yes or no to. " 49 (1984); Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 Law and Human Behavior 31 (1984); Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 Law and Human Behavior 53 (1984); Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth, & Harrington, Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 Law and Human Behavior 95 (1984).
To the extent the Court reads Adams as eschewing unthinking adherence to the particular two-part inquiry propounded in footnote 21, I have no quarrel. Thus, whatever ambiguity respondent may find in this record, we think that the trial court, aided as it undoubtedly was by its assessment of Colby's demeanor, was entitled to resolve it in favor of the State. . Ante, at 423 (emphasis added). See Adams v. Texas, supra; Boulden v. Holman, supra; Maxwell v. Bishop, supra.
Nonetheless the Court relies on the failure to object either as evidence that Colby was not ambiguous in expressing her views, ante, at 431, n. 11, or to suggest that defense counsel had some duty to attempt rehabilitation in order to resolve any ambiguities in Colby's testimony, ante, at 434-435. See post, at 450 (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 2d 383 (1979).
. Nothing more was required. . Under the facts of this case, the prospective juror in question was properly excused for cause. Although this task may be difficult in any event, it is obviously made more difficult by the fact that the standard applied in Adams differs markedly from the language of footnote 21. In addition to dispensing with Witherspoon § reference to "automatic" decisionmaking, this standard does not require that a juror's bias be proved with "unmistakable clarity." The prosecutors had to be as I said more alert to make sure that there was sufficient evidence to convict them with.".
It is most curious that the identical reasoning is now marshaled to justify a "test" purportedly derived from the Court's holding in that case. "Well the media concurred in the decision so they naturally made it as difficult as they could for handling the people involved, and as I said, there were several hundred who had to go back to court. Because jurors no longer have the unfettered discretion to impose or withhold capital punishment that they had in Illinois and other States at the time of Witherspoon, the Court asserts, there is no longer any reason to require empaneling of jurors who will merely consider a sentence of death under some circumstances.