What is not debatable is that Bray was not preceded by prior litigation indicating we would not consider the "prevention clause" issue, whereas this case was preceded by a refusal to take the very foundational issue that JUSTICE O'CONNOR argues is within the literal terms of the second question focusing on salaries. [And the Court of Appeals's] unsupported speculation falls far short of the demonstration of a `significant segregative effect in another district' discussed in the Milliken opinion." [ to Pet. It reads the case as categorically forbidding imposition of a remedy on a guilty district with intended consequences in a neighboring innocent district, unless the constitutional violation yielded segregative effects in that innocent district. Instead of seeking to remove the racial identity of the various schools within the KCMSD, the District Court has set out on a program to create a school district that was equal to or superior to the surrounding SSD's. .
Cf.
1954).
to Pet.
to Pet. The Court has not only rewritten Milliken I; it has effectively overruled a subsequent case expressly refusing to constrain remedial equity powers to the extent the Court does
The dissent also "agree[d] with the [S]tate that logic d[id] not directly relate the pay of parking lot attendants, trash haulers The Court and the dissent attempt to reconcile the different statements by the lower courts as to whether white flight was caused by segregation or desegregation.
In Gautreaux, the fact that the CHA and HUD had the authority to operate outside the limits of the City of Chicago meant that an order to fund or build housing beyond those limits would "not necessarily entail coercion of uninvolved governmental units . In September 1987, the District Court adopted, for the most part, KCMSD's long-range capital improvements plan at a cost in excess of $187 million.
. attract non-minority students back to the KCMSD." 47-49. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/515/70/case.html, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2967250?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
directly address and relate to the constitutional violation," Milliken II,
593 F.
III, 1, 2.
i.
While the Court suggests otherwise, ante, at 12-13, 29, the District Court did not ground its orders of salary increases solely on the goal of attracting students back to the KCMSD. Freeman v. Pitts,
The District Court's willingness to adopt such stereotypes stemmed from a misreading of our earliest school desegregation case. App.
; see generally id., at 292-298.
Indeed, in the school desegregation context, federal courts are specifically admonished to "take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs," Milliken v. Bradley, (1974) (Milliken I). And while respondents seemingly gave some thought to the bare possibility that
Dwyer, Pendent Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 Cal. 418 U.S., at 741 Brief for Petitioners 27-32; Reply Brief for Petitioners 6-12.
Thus, Hamilton sought to narrow the expansive Anti-Federalist reading of inherent judicial equity power by demonstrating that the defined nature of the English and colonial equity system - with its specified claims and remedies - would continue to exist under the federal judiciary.
black ones would be stopped at some point. The Court of Appeals also understood that the State had renewed this challenge.
Hamilton merely repeated the well-known principle that equity would be controlled no less by rules and practices than was the common law.
The point of the Equal Protection Clause is not to enforce strict race-mixing, but to ensure that blacks and whites are treated equally by the State without regard to their skin color.
Cf.
and food handlers . We held that before a district court could order an interdistrict remedy, there must be a showing that "racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation." See Mo. 427 , 4]
See ante, at 12 ("In this case, it may be the `myriad factors of human existence,' that have prompted the white exodus from the KCMSD . The desire to reform a school district, or any other institution, cannot so captivate the Judiciary that it forgets its constitutionally mandated role. v. Brinkman, As the language I have quoted above demonstrates, we made it very clear in Gautreaux that the District Court could order relief going beyond the boundaries of the City of Chicago without any finding of
A. Croson Co., 488
Since that time, however, the District Court has ordered salary assistance to all but three of the approximately 5,000 KCMSD employees. First, the District Court did not mean by an "intradistrict violation" what the Court apparently means by it today. The District Court found that magnet schools would assist in remedying the deficiencies in student achievement in the KCMSD, see supra, at 4-5.
402 U.S. 1
The question presented in the petition for certiorari asks whether the order comports with our cases requiring that remedies "address and relate to the constitutional violation and be tailored to cure the condition that offends the Constitution," Pet. See, e.g., 639 F. The total cost of this component of the desegregation remedy since 1987 is over $200 million.
Id., at 1493.
Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 18-20, pp.
639 F. Because we had denied certiorari on the State's challenge to review the scope of the remedial order, we resisted the State's efforts to challenge the scope of the remedy. .
, 16] Gautreaux, supra, at 306. U.S. 555, 560 Although the fashioning of judicial remedies to this end has been left, in the first instance, to the equitable discretion of the district courts, in Milliken I we established an absolute limitation on this exercise of equitable authority. The judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed.
KCMSD schools received an AAA rating eight years ago, and the present remedial programs have been in place for seven years. cannot defend its failure to affirmatively act to eliminate the structure and effects of its past dual system on the basis of restrictive state law." (1977) (Milliken II), we held that a district court is authorized to remedy all conditions flowing directly from the constitutional violations committed by state or local officials, including the educational deficits that result from a segregated school system (programs aimed to correct those deficits are therefore frequently referred to as Milliken II programs). Thus, the proper response by the District Court should have been to eliminate to the extent practicable the vestiges of prior de jure segregation within the KCMSD: a system-wide reduction in student achievement and the existence of 25 racially identifiable schools with a population of over 90% black students. First, the District Court ordered that the KCMSD be restored to an AAA classification, the highest
495 U.S., at 60 Two Terms after Milliken, we decided Hills v. Gautreaux, Milliken II, supra, at 280.
1875, Art. Although we held in Milliken II, "[The judiciary's] powers would have become too arbitrary to have been endured in a country like this, which boasts of being governed in all respects Footnote 5 ] In related litigation about the schools of St. Louis, the Eighth Circuit has noted that "[b]efore the Civil War, Missouri prohibited the creation of schools to teach reading and writing to blacks.
would also assist in desegregating the district by attracting white students back into the school system. [ MISSOURI v. JENKINS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) At the more obvious level, there is in fact no break in the chain of causation linking the effects of desegregation with those of segregation. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. Supp., at 1492.
In November 1986, the District Court approved further capital improvements in order to remove the vestiges of racial segregation and "to .
The significance of this fact is subject to assessment. Id., at 747, n. 22; see Milliken II, . ] "During the hearing on the liability issue in this case there was an abundance of evidence that many residents of the KCMSD left the district and moved to the suburbs because of the district's efforts to integrate its schools." "The metropolitan remedy would require, in effect, consolidation of 54 independent school districts historically administered as separate units into a vast new super school district."
The State of Missouri and Kansas City students had been involved in an 18-year-long litigation regarding school.
But they did not do so, and instead engaged those arguments on the merits. [ MISSOURI v. JENKINS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) We have most recently summed up the obligation to correct the condition of de jure segregation by saying that "the duty of a former de jure district is to take `whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.'" Motivated by our worthy desire to eradicate segregation, however, we have disregarded this principle and given the courts unprecedented authority to shape a remedy in equity. "Instead, the [KCMSD] chose to operate some completely segregated schools and some integrated ones," Jenkins, 593 F. [ MISSOURI v. JENKINS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) 593 F. 1961). [ MISSOURI v. JENKINS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995)
[ MISSOURI v. JENKINS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) All the judges who spoke to the issue below concluded that segregated schooling in the KCMSD contributed to the exodus of white students from the district. , 17], [ MISSOURI v. JENKINS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) (1978), mental hospitals, Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 902 F.2d 250 (CA4), cert. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp.
But these are questions that the Court rightly leaves to be answered on remand.
[ MISSOURI v. JENKINS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995)
for Cert.
Supp., at 38.
383 In this fixed system, each of these specific actions then called for a specific equitable remedy. 131-133 (Order of Nov. 12, 1986), and extensive capital improvements to the schools of the KCMSD.
App. [ MISSOURI v. JENKINS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) The District Court's pursuit of "desegregative attractiveness" cannot be reconciled with our cases placing limitations on a district court's remedial authority. Id., at 131.
For these reasons, I join the opinion of the Court.
No one on the Court has had the benefit of briefing