Confessions induced by trickery or physical abuse were never admissible at trial, and any confession secured without the required procedural safeguards could, in the courts' discretion, be excluded on grounds of fairness or prejudice. I fail to comprehend the distinction. At least in part in order to preserve its clarity, we have over the years refused to sanction attempts to expand our Miranda holding. 1926, 1930, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), where admission of a lineup identification was approved, the Court emphasized that no question was presented as to the admissibility of anything said or done at the lineup. 5a, 7a-8a. 763, 768, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970) (failure to assert waives right to complain about testimonial compulsion). The State, on the other hand, had urged that the privilege prohibited it only from compelling the accused to make a formal testimonial statement against himself in an official legal proceeding. Even before Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. Again contrary to the majority's intimations, ante, at 657, no customers or employees were wandering about the store in danger of coming across Quarles' discarded weapon.
1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968) (prison cell during defendant's sentence for an unrelated offense); but see Orozco v. Texas, supra, 394 U.S., at 328-331, 89 S.Ct., at 1097-1099 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 2357, 2364, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). "that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." The majority's only contention is that police officers could more easily protect the public if Miranda did not apply to custodial interrogations concerning the public's safety.7 But Miranda was not a decision about public safety; it was a decision about coerced confessions. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, rejected the idea of a public safety exception: Furthermore, even if a public safety exception was allowed, he believed it would have been inapplicable in this particular case: Justice O'Connor filed a separate opinion, also rejecting the idea of a public safety exception, but arguing that the presence of the gun itself should still be admissible evidence. Behind the cartons, the police found a loaded revolver. 2317, 2321, 2324-2325, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). 1244, 1249, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980).11 When they ruled on the issue, the New York courts were entirely correct in deciding that Quarles' gun was the tainted fruit of a nonconsensual interrogation and therefore was inadmissible under our precedents. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187, 97 S.Ct. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400, 96 S.Ct. Since petitioner's derivative-evidence theory is of considerable constitutional importance. Because we hold that there is no violation of Miranda in this case, we have no occasion to reach arguments made by the State and the United States as amicus curiae that the gun is admissible either because it is non-testimonial or because the police would inevitably have discovered it absent their questioning.
Officer Kraft's abrupt and pointed question pressured Quarles in precisely the way that the Miranda Court feared the custodial interrogations would coerce self-incriminating testimony. Should respondent be acquitted at trial, the State will be precluded from pressing its federal claim again on appeal. So long as the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later come upon it. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S., at 445-446, 447, 452, and n. 26, 94 S.Ct., at 2364-2365, 2365, 2368, and n. 26. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Failure to administer Miranda warnings violates only a nonconstitutional prophylactic. . Citizens in our society have a deeply rooted social obligation "to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement." that rigidity [has also been called a] strength of the decision. Coerced confessions were simply inadmissible in criminal prosecutions. Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part (O’Connor): There is not sufficient justification to depart from the Miranda rule here, but the subsequent statements made after the warnings were given should be admitted. . The circumstances of Quarles' arrest have never been in dispute. it would be inconsistent with our precedents to permit petitioner to raise it for the first time now.
See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. See Note, Developments in the Law—Confessions, 79 Harv.L.Rev. Id., at 223, 91 S.Ct., at 644. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 45 S.Ct. Disagreements of the scope of the "public-safety" exception and mistakes in its application are inevitable.4. In my view, a "public safety" exception unnecessarily blurs the edges of the clear line heretofore established and makes Miranda's requirements more difficult to understand. The majority now proposes to return to the scales of social utility to calculate whether Miranda's prophylactic rule remains cost-effective when threats to the public's safety are added to the balance. We held that all the statements should have been suppressed. Courts around the country were spending countless hours reviewing the facts of individual custodial interrogations. The irony of the majority's decision is that the public's safety can be perfectly well protected without abridging the Fifth Amendment. Pp. Rather, the critical question Miranda addresses is who shall bear the cost of securing the public safety when such questions are asked and answered: the defendant or the State.
Jun 12, 1984. Before today's opinion, the Court had twice concluded that, under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. This decision will lead to a new era of confusion on whether a custodial interrogation was conducted properly. With Quarles' hands manacled behind his back and the other officers standing close by, Officer Kraft questioned Quarles: "Where is the gun?" N.Y. Though the majority's opinion is cloaked in the beguiling language of utilitarianism, the Court has sanctioned sub silentio criminal prosecutions based on compelled self-incriminating statements. See 417 U.S., at 445, 94 S.Ct., at 2364; cf. We have found the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment inapplicable in cases where the " 'exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." As the New York Court of Appeals observed, there was nothing to suggest that any of the officers were any longer concerned for their own physical safety. In this case, the officer asked about the location of the gun with an immediate interest in ensuring that it did not pose a danger to an innocent bystander, or fall into the hands of an accomplice. There is a “public safety” exception to the Miranda rule, whereby Miranda rights do not need to be read before an officer can inquire about something that may pose a danger to public safety. Individuals in this situation are faced with what Justice Goldberg once described as "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt." An answer was needed to insure that future danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public area. NEW YORK v. Benjamin QUARLES. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), before asking him where the gun was located. 3469, 3476, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). 653-660. The majority concludes that the State may rely on this incriminating statement to convict the suspect of possessing a weapon. The most obvious example, first suggested by Judge Henry Friendly, involves interrogation directed to the discovery and termination of an on-going criminal activity such as kidnaping or extortion. Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310, 1314, 99 S.Ct. Similarly, where "statements taken in violation of the Miranda principles [have] not be[en] used to prove the prosecution's case at trial," the Court has allowed evidence derived from those statements to be admitted. Indeed, were constitutional adjudication always conducted in such an ad hoc manner, the Bill of Rights would be a most unreliable protector of individual liberties. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. Thus, when the Miranda violation consists of a deliberate and flagrant abuse of the accused's constitutional rights, amounting to a denial of due process, application of a broader exclusionary rule is warranted. It was only after securing the loaded revolver and giving the warnings that he continued with investigatory questions about the ownership and place of purchase of the gun. Miranda has never been read to prohibit the police from asking questions to secure the public safety.
Before today's opinion, the procedures established in Miranda v. Arizona had "the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation are not admissible." 1983-1984). In other words, the case is problematic because police compelled respondent not only to provide the gun but also to admit that he knew where it was and that it was his. 716 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. Since the time Miranda was decided, the Court has repeatedly refused to bend the literal terms of that decision. Although the supermarket was open to the public, Quarles' arrest took place during the middle of the night when the store was apparently deserted except for the clerks at the checkout counter. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice STEVENS join, dissenting. 1594, 1596, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964). 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (refusal to extend Miranda requirements to interviews with probation officers); Fare v. Michael C., i442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. App.