452; see also id., at 461-462, 490-491, 674. See Friedberg v. Building Committee, 218 Va. 659, 239 S.E.2d 106 (1977).
In addition, the police attempted to persuade Barrett to waive the right he had asserted not to make a written statement without the assistance of counsel, not once, but twice, absent any indication from Barrett that he had changed his mind on this point. Please log in or sign up for a free trial to access this feature. An accused who invokes his right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available, "unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Respondent said he understood. The court held that the statements made to the polygraph examiner were voluntary and the result of a knowing waiver of his right to remain silent." to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.". You've got the tape recording on the request for the lawyer. . The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that an inquiry he made of a police officer at the time he was in custody did not "initiate" a conversation with the officer, and that therefore statements by the respondent growing out of that conversation should have been excluded from evidence under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. Under these circumstances, Bradshaw had voluntarily waived his right to counsel during interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S., at 486, n. 9. The facts of the case are surely unique.
at 953, 636 P.2d at 1013. The Oregon Court of Appeals stated that it did not "construe defendant's question about what was going to happen to him to have been a waiver of his right to counsel, invoked only minutes before. at 953, 636 P.2d at 1013. By clicking on this tab, you are expressly stating that you were one of the attorneys appearing in this matter. 292, 74 L.Ed.2d 276 (1982). There are some inquiries, such as a request for a drink of water or a request to use a telephone, that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation. Compare Fields v. Wyrick, 682 F.2d 154, 158 (CA8) (Edwards "creat[ed] a per se rule"), rev'd and remanded, 459 U. S. 42 (1982) (per curiam); United States v. Thierman, 678 F.2d 1331, 1338 (CA9 1982) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (reading Edwards as applying per se rule); State v. Willie, 410 So. that provides `specific guidance to police and courts in this recurring situation.'" respondent's being "subject[ed] to further interrogation by the authorities."
Barrett stated that "he would not give the police any written statements but he had no problem in talking about the incident." Compare Fields v. Wyrick, 682 F.2d 154, 158 (CA8) ( Edwards "creat[ed] a per se rule"), rev'd and remanded, 459 U.S. 42 (1982) (per curiam); United States v. Thierman, 678 F.2d 1331, 1338 (CA9 1982) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (reading Edwards as applying per se rule); State v. Willie, 410 So.2d 1019, 1028 (La. See also Edwards, 451 U.S., at 484. Id., at 100. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), this Court recognized that, "[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice. The authorities exercise virtually unfettered control over the accused. I joined the judgment in Edwards because on the facts "it [was] clear that Edwards [had been] taken from his cell against his will and [improperly] subjected to renewed interrogation." In September 1980, the police were investigating the death of Lowell Reynolds in Tillamook County, Oregon.
Ibid. Relying on Edwards, the Oregon court held that respondent had not initiated the subsequent interrogation. The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision to the contrary rested on the view that requests for counsel are not to be narrowly construed. Shortly thereafter, he asked a police officer, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" Ante, at 529. Decided by Burger Court . In my concurring opinion in Ross, I said it was "essential to have a Court opinion . You have requested an attorney, and I don't want you talking to me unless you so desire, because anything you say -- because -- since you have requested an attorney, you know, it has to be at your own free will."
Respondent agreed to take such an examination, saying that he was willing to do whatever he could to clear up the matter. At this point, respondent was placed under arrest for furnishing liquor to Reynolds, a minor, and again advised of his Miranda rights.
In that case, the defendant said that he wanted an attorney "`before making a deal.'" Gary D. Babcock argued the cause for respondent. They view the "initiation" question as the first step of a two-step analysis, the second step being the application of the Zerbst standard that requires examination of the "totality of the circumstances." In September, 1980, Oregon police were investigating the death of one Lowell Reynolds in Tillamook County. Lower court State appellate court . . Id., at 16. The Zerbst standard is one that is widely understood and followed.
I says, `I can't prevent you from talking, but you understand where your place — you know, where your standing is here?' The holding of the Court in Edwards cannot in my view fairly be reduced to this. We did not there hold that the "initiation" of a conversation by a defendant such as respondent would amount to a waiver of a previously invoked right to counsel; we held that after the right to counsel had been asserted by an accused, further interrogation of the accused should not take place "unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." If the police could exploit such questions as the one Bradshaw asked to ask further questions of an accused in the face of an express desire to have a lawyer present, the protections of Miranda would dissipate. that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a desire . Supreme Court of United States.https://leagle.com/images/logo.png. We now conclude that the Oregon Court of Appeals misapplied our decision in.
The plurality explicitly refers to the "prophylactic rule" of Edwards. If respondent's question had been posed by Jean-Paul Sartre before a class of philosophy students, it might well have evinced a desire for a "generalized" discussion. Id., at 474 (emphasis added). Yet Miranda's procedural protections were adopted precisely in order "to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings."
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 486, n. 9. common sense. The inquiries are separate, and clarity of application is not gained by melding them together. I would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The officer answered by saying "You do not have to talk to me. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, JUSTICE POWELL suggests that there is confusion as to whether Edwards announced a per se rule. The judgment of the Oregon Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. ", I agree with the plurality that, in order to constitute "initiation" under, In this case, for example, Bradshaw's initiating question ("what is going to happen to me now?") 462 U. S. 1044-1047. at 16. When someone in custody asks, "What is going to happen to me now?
We held that subsequent incriminating statements made without his attorney present violated the rights secured to the defendant by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
To this extent, I agree with his plurality opinion.