U.S. 959 See, e.g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S. Ct. 1852, 68 L. Ed.
Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims will be raised only in those cases where a defendant has been found guilty of the offense charged and from the perspective of hindsight there is a natural tendency to speculate as to whether a different trial strategy might have been more successful. "[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. (1991) (harmless-error rule applicable to admission of involuntary confessions); Duckworth v. Eagan, See n. 5, supra. 2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).12, The performance of defense counsel is a crucial component of the system of protections designed to ensure that capital punishment is administered with some degree of rationality. U.S. 365 After his two accomplices were arrested, respondent surrendered to police and voluntarily gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third of the criminal episodes. And the majority properly cautions courts, when reviewing a lawyer's selection amongst a set of options, to avoid the hubris of hindsight.
That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command. ] See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, And, rejecting the strict "outcome-determinative" test employed by some courts, the Court adopts as the appropriate standard for prejudice a requirement that the defendant "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," defining a "reasonable probability" as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Accordingly, counsel's general duty to investigate, ante, at 690, takes on supreme importance to a defendant in the context of developing mitigating evidence to present to a judge or jury considering the sentence of death; claims of ineffective assistance in the performance of that duty should therefore be considered with commensurate care.
U.S. 365, 381 U.S., at 489 From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution.
The Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote, 946 F.2d 571 (CA8 1991), even though it had two years earlier overruled its decision in Collins in light of our decision in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 158 (1932), Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. They cannot be classified according to likelihood of causing prejudice.
It focuses on the question whether counsel's deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.
A post hoc vision of what would have been the case years later has no bearing on the force of this showing. Second, the error must be so severe that it gives rise to prejudice, defined quite clearly in Strickland as "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 7; see also id., at 14. Footnote 2 Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Nevertheless, the standard is not quite appropriate.
501
In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. (1988), and urges us to decide this question as a threshold matter. The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state court's interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court's interpretation. [ If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one .
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting. With respect to each of the three convictions for capital murder, the trial judge concluded: "A careful consideration of all matters presented to the court impels the conclusion that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances .
as amicus curiae. [ U.S. 668 2d 346 (1972) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 248-312, 91 S. Ct. 1454, 1487-1520, 28 L. Ed. Turning to the merits, the Court of Appeals stated that the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel accorded criminal defendants a right to "counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances." , argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Nix, supra, at 175-176. denied, The majority defends its refusal to adopt more specific standards primarily on the ground that "[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant."
2 Under the Strickland standard that prevailed until today, respondent is entitled to relief on his ineffective-assistance claim, having shown both deficient performance and a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome.
Finding the existence of the first of these factors, and no mitigating factors, the jury sentenced respondent to death. U.S. 364, 379] Footnote 5 [ Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. 493 . * This case and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed.
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2971, 49 L. Ed. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.
Id., at 1257-1258. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. Shelby has not made the required showing with
During a 10-day period in September 1976, respondent planned and committed three groups of crimes, which included three brutal stabbing murders, torture, kidnaping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case represents one sound attempt to develop particularized standards designed to ensure that all defendants receive effective legal assistance. The court held, however, that the exhaustion requirement is "a matter of comity rather than a matter of jurisdiction" and hence admitted of exceptions. [
With him on the briefs were Clint Miller, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and J. Brent Standridge, Assistant Attorney General. Accordingly, I join neither the Court's opinion nor its judgment. In other words, ineffective-assistance claims predicated on failure to make wholly frivolous or unethical arguments will generally be dispensed with under Strickland's first prong, without recourse to the second, and hence will not raise the questions at issue in this case. Respondent was convicted of committing murder in the course of a robbery. Unfairness or unreliability does not result unless counsel's ineffectiveness deprives the defendant of a substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him. U.S., at 656 time of trial. 2067-2069.
In short, inquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's investigation decisions, just as it may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's other litigation decisions. 8. U.S., at 687 I cannot agree. Brief Fact Summary.
489 359, 624 F.2d 196 (en banc), cert.
Respondent has identified an error of such magnitude that it falls within the narrow class of attorney errors precluding reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev.
(Powell J. concurring). 2d 592 (1976) (bar on attorney-client consultation during overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 45 L. Ed. The determinative question - whether there is "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id., at 694 - remains unchanged.
A285-A286.
U.S. 364, 365]
); id., at 1288-1291 (opinion of Hill, J. The state and lower federal courts have developed standards for distinguishing effective from inadequate assistance.1 Today, for the first time, this Court attempts to synthesize and clarify those standards. (1989) (police may search greenhouse from helicopter at altitude of 400 feet without warrant). The test formulated in Strickland for determining whether counsel has rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance reflects this concern. Although state court findings of fact made in the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to the deference requirement of ยง 2254(d), and although district court findings are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), both the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact. Not surprisingly, the Court's reliance on hindsight finds no support in Strickland itself. ); id., at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney, J., joined by Fay and Hill, JJ.