This is sufficient to sustain the finding of the pecuniary gain factor. At the Columbus Police Department, Lawrence was interrogated by Detective James McCoskey and FBI Special Agent Harry Trombitas. United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
2. The district court denied the motion. He had no single, stable caretaker. McCoskey informed Lawrence that he was being charged with bank robbery. Given Carpenter's material misrepresentations and omissions here, a jury could find that Carpenter was a perpetrator of the gold-mine Ponzi scheme. Id. Begin typing to search, use arrow keys to navigate, use enter to select. A criminal indictment is facially valid if it: “(1) contains the elements of the offense charged, (2) fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend and (3) enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” United States v. Titterington, 374 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. Instead a defendant normally should raise those claims in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. United States v. Al–Cholan, 610 F.3d 945, 953 (6th Cir.2010). Under 18 U.S.C. We employ a two-step process in reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct. The amelioration of society's woes is far too heavy a burden for the individual criminal defendant to bear. ; Fed.R.Crim.P. The district court denied Lawrence's motion to strike the notice of intent to seek the death penalty. 18 U.S.C. After Lawrence was sentenced, one of the alternate jurors who was dismissed before deliberations began contacted Hurst's widow by e-mail. Hurst's relatives displayed family photos and read statements about Hurst and the effect of his death. The prosecution came forward with race-neutral explanations. That other courts have used a slightly different formulation does not mean the definition used in this case was deficient. Lawrence contends the district court erred by permitting improper and excessive use of victim-impact evidence by the government during the sentencing phase. Such a defendant “must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292; see also United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 864, 122 S.Ct. endstream endobj 66 0 obj <>stream Boyd, 640 F.3d at 668. in considering whether a sentence of death is justified, it shall not consider the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim and that the jury is not to recommend a sentence of death unless it has concluded that it would recommend a sentence of death for the crime in question no matter what the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim may be.
The district court concluded that the evidence was relevant to Lawrence's motive and intent because he maintained that he did not shoot Hurst intentionally, and that the probative value of the evidence was not sufficiently outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. However, Lawrence points to language in § 10607(e)(2)(B), which, in the case of a victim who is deceased, like Bryan Hurst, recognizes, as a victim, one person (i.e., a spouse, legal guardian, parent, child, sibling, another family member, or another person) who is designated by the court to assume the rights of the deceased victim. The jury was asked to consider whether “the fact that Daryl Lawrence, within a year of the commission of the capital crimes, committed three other bank robberies armed with a firearm, wearing a mask, and making threats to victims” was an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Please try again. Lawrence has not shown that the evidence's probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 17. US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The proofs showed that Lawrence was born in 1975 in Marysville, Ohio to a heroin-addicted mother who was serving time in prison. The jury had, in the guilt phase, just unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawrence was guilty of committing three armed bank robberies and attempting a fourth, and of having killed Hurst during the course of the attempted bank robbery.
24. It has been soundly rejected by other courts. at 2166 (denying relief under plain-error review—even if error were deemed structural—for lack of showing that error impugned the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings). In reality, per Brito's testimony at trial, Carpenter had never worked with Brito before or visited the mine. 32.1(b) File Name: 16a0089p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _____ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TIMOTHY IVORY CARPENTER (14-1572); TIMOTHY MICHAEL SANDERS (14-1805), Defendants-Appellants. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). The point was not unduly emphasized. An eight-count indictment was returned and filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on January 20, 2005. 20. This harmless-error doctrine preserves the “ ‘principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.’ “ Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct.
Moreover, Lawrence's counsel responded to the prosecutor's mischaracterization in her closing argument, insisting that Lawrence was not trying to minimize or excuse his actions. ?��(� ��'��,��? On the other hand, a prosecutor can make a fair response to a claim made by the defendant or his counsel. See Bolden, 545 F.3d at 615 (collecting cases). Friends and relatives testified that they cared for Lawrence, that he was a good person, and that they would be deeply affected if he were sentenced to death. “The evidence must be viewed ‘in the light most favorable to its proponent, giving the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.’ “ United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 364 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 775 (6th Cir.2002)). Lawrence has not identified an error in the district court's instructions, and our review of the record shows that the court properly set out the burdens of proof, told the jurors what they could consider as they weighed the sentence, and advised them that the weighing process was not a mechanical process.