Ibid. Ibid.
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, dissenting.
denied, 353 U.S. 964, 77 S.Ct. 1st Cir.1982)." In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. denied, 414 U. S. 1093 (1973); Anderson v. Phelps, 451 So. Ibid.
Conceding some of the petitioners' arguments, Justice Thomas cited a classic line from a Seventh Circuit decision, Williams v. Boles by Frank Easterbrook: Many things—beating with a rubber truncheon, water torture, electric shock, incessant noise, reruns of Space: 1999—may cause agony as they occur, yet leave no enduring injury. Cf. This case requires us to decide whether the use of excessivephysical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusualpunishment when the inmate does not suffer serious injury.
Respondents invoke the reasoning of courts that have held the use of force by prison officers under such circumstances beyond the scope of "punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 1679, 1680, 114 L.Ed.2d 75 (1991). Ante, at 5. Id., at 1015. At the time of the incident that is the subject of this suit, petitioner Keith Hudson was an inmate at the state penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. That formulation plainly reveals our prior assumption that a serious deprivation is always required.
In this case, the Fifth Circuit found Hudson's claim untenable because his injuries were "minor."
Ct. App. Yet the blows directed at Hudson, which caused bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate, are not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes. As might be expected from this primacy, Estelle stated the principle underlying the cases discussed in Wilson: punishments "incompatible with the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" or "involv[ing] the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" are "repugnant to the Eighth Amendment." These measures should be adequate to control any docketmanagement problems that might result from meritless prisoner claims. 2d 871 (La. How could it be otherwise when the constitutional touchstone is whether punishment is cruel and unusual? See Estelle, supra, 429 U.S., at 102, 97 S.Ct., at 290. ), writ denied, 420 So. denied, 372 U. S. 930 (1963); United States ex rel. Pp. denied, 415 U.S. 957, 94 S.Ct. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 103. Petitioner Hudson, a Louisiana prison inmate, testified that minor bruises, facial swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate he had suffered resulted from a beating by respondent prison guards McMillian and Woods while he was handcuffed and shackled following an argument with McMillian, and that respondent Mezo, a supervisor on duty, watched the beating but merely told the officers "not to … 859, 47 L.Ed.2d 84 (1975); Lewis v. Listi, 377 So.2d 551, 553 (La.Ct.App.3d Cir.1979); Bastida v. State, 269 So.2d 544, 545 (La.Ct.App. Respondents argue that, aside from the significant injury test applied by the Fifth Circuit, their conduct cannot constitute an Eighth Amendment violation because it was "isolated and unauthorized." Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953, 954-956 (CA7 1956), cert. 2d 1188 (La. As Wilson made clear, that inquiry is necessary but not sufficient when a prisoner seeks to show that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. Moreover, by distinguishing this case from "conditions" cases, the Court resurrects a distinction that we have repudiated as "not only unsupportable in principle but unworkable in practice."
The Court's attempted distinction of Estelle is also unpersuasive: "Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are 'serious.' Likewise, both implicate the principle that " '[p]rison administrators . Moreover, to the extent that respondents rely on the unauthorized na-. In concluding to the contrary, the Court today goes far beyond our precedents. For generations, judges and commentators regarded the Eighth Amendment as applying only to torturous punishments meted out by statutes or sentencing judges, and not generally to any hardship that might befall a prisoner during incarceration. As the Court makes clear, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of "pain," rather than "injury." CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, No.90-6531.
This is puzzling. Respondents argue that, aside from the significant injury test applied by the Fifth Circuit, their conduct cannot constitute an Eighth Amendment violation because it was "isolated and unauthorized." The Court's opinion explained that the justification for that particularly high standard of proof was required by the exigencies present during a serious prison disturbance. That component is contextual and responsive to "contemporary standards of decency." Ante, at 6 (emphasis added). 929 F.2d 1014 (1990). Hudson sued the three corrections officers in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 561-562 (1978); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 817-818 (1982) (unsubstantiated allegations of malice are insufficient to overcome pretrial qualified immunity). Departure from this baseline is justified where, as in Whitley, prison officials act in response to an emergency; in such situations their conduct cannot be characterized as "wanton" unless it is taken "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." 27, n. 1. But those degrading punishments which in any State had become obsolete before its existing constitution was adopted, we think may well be held forbidden by it as cruel and unusual") (emphasis added). 1st Cir. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 750-751 (1833). By contrast, officials confronted with a prison disturbance must balance the threat unrest poses to inmates, prison workers, administrators, and visitors against the harm inmates may suffer if guards use force. 452 U.S., at 343, 101 S.Ct., at 2397. Id., at 320-321 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (CA2), cert. Ct. App. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348, 106 S.Ct. Hudson testified that, on the way there, McMillian punched Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach while Woods held the inmate in place and kicked and punched him from behind. Abusive behavior by prison guards is deplorable conduct that properly evokes outrage and contempt.
Instead, "the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on 'whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.'''
5 Respondents concede that. For example, the appropriate inquiry when an inmate alleges that prison officials failed to attend to serious medical needs is whether the officials exhibited "deliberate indifference.".
The Court’s decision held that claims of excessive force must prove that the officer (s) used force maliciously, sadistically, and for the purpose of causing harm. But this inherently self-interested concern has no appropriate role in interpreting the contours of a substantive constitutional right. Likewise, the inquiry whether the deprivation is objectively serious would be encompassed within our determination whether it was "cruel and unusual. In recognition of these similarities, we hold that whenever prison officials stand ac-. These determinations are, however, required by the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits only those punishments that are "cruel and unusual." denied, 423 U. S. 1075,96 S. Ct. 859,47 L. Ed. In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat "reasonably perceived by the responsible officials," and "any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response." "[I]t is well settled that it is not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined." 1983); if available state remedies were not constitutionally adequate, petitioner would have a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the excessive force context, society's expectations are different. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. Respondents nonetheless assert that a significant injury requirement of the sort imposed by the Fifth Circuit is mandated by what we have termed the "objective component" of Eighth Amendment analysis. Furthermore, "[t]he conduct of McMillian and Woods qualified as clearly excessive and occasioned unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Held: The use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even though the inmate does not suffer serious injury. As might be expected from this primacy, Estelle stated the principle underlying the cases discussed in Wilson: Punishments "incompatible with the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" or "involv[ing] the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" are "repugnant to the Eighth Amendment." ishment ... "). Whether the prison disturbance is a riot or a lesser disruption, corrections officers must balance the need "to maintain or restore discipline" through force against the risk of injury to inmates. Moreover, prison officials are entitled to a determination before trial whether they acted in an objectively reasonable manner, thereby entitling them to a qualified immunity defense.
During the early morning hours of October 30,1983, Hudson and McMillian argued. Far from rejecting Whitley's insight that the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain standard must be applied with regard for the nature of the alleged Eighth Amendment violation, the Wilson Court adopted it. I do not read anything in the Court's opinion to limit injury cognizable under the Eighth Amendment to physical injury. I write separately to highlight two concerns not addressed by the Court in its opinion. If anything, I would think that a deprivation inflicted continuously over a long period would be of greater concern to society than a deprivation inflicted on one particular occasion.4, The Court's attempted distinction of Estelle is also unpersuasive: "Because society does not expect that prisoners will. 1st Cir. Furthermore, to characterize the serious injury requirement as "arbitrary" is not to explain why it should be eliminated in this particular context while it remains applicable to all other prison deprivations. That is not to say that every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. ' " Ante, at 9 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S., at 319, 106 S.Ct., at 1084). The case involved a claim that prison doctors had inadequately attended an inmate's medical needs. App.
1981); Shields v. State Through Dep't of Corrections, 380 So. 2d 483, 486-87 (La. Respondents Jack McMillian, Marvin Woods, and Arthur Mezo served as corrections security officers at the Angola facility. It held that inmates alleging use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment must prove: (1) significant injury; (2) resulting "directly and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need"; (3) the excessiveness of which was objectively unreasonable; and (4) that the action constituted an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. 1972); Adams v. State, 247 So. 220 (1886), as his most "fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.". With respect to the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, however, Wilson suggested no departure from Estelle and its progeny. Estelle, supra, 429 U.S., at 102, 97 S.Ct., at 290 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (CA8 1968)). But there is quite a gap between "routine discomfort" and the denial of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. But those degrading punishments which in any State had become obsolete before its existing constitution was adopted, we think may well be held forbidden by it as cruel and unusual") (emphasis added).