The italics in the quotation are mine. The obvious purpose of the orders made, taken together, was to drive all citizens of Japanese ancestry into Assembly Centers within the zones of their residence, under pain of criminal prosecution. 13. The courts can exercise only the judicial power, can apply only law, and must abide by the Constitution, or they cease to be civil courts and become instruments of military policy. And I had supposed that under these circumstances a conviction for violating one of the orders could not stand.
But the outstanding orders here contained no such contradictory commands. About 64,000 were freed from internment and from any special restrictions, and only 2,000 were interned.
We know that is the fact. A chronological recitation of events will make it plain that the petitioner's supposed offense did not, in truth, consist in his refusal voluntarily to leave the area which included his home in obedience to the order excluding him therefrom.
If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we'd never miss them in two weeks, because the white farmers can take over and produce everything the Jap grows. * * *', The Final Report, p. 9, casts a cloud of suspicion over the entire group by saying that 'while it was believed that some were loyal, it was known that many were not.'
There is no way to determine their loyalty. About two-thirds of them were Japanese-Americans who were born in the United States.
The only course by which the petitioner could avoid arrest and prosecution was to go to that camp according to instructions to be given him when he reported at a Civil Control Center. Court should take this opportunity to overrule them once and for all. Korematsu was born on our soil, of parents born in Japan.
Even during that period a succeeding commander may revoke it all.
I think we should learn something from that experience. The petitioner, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted in a federal district court for remaining in San Leandro, California, a 'Military Area', contrary to Civilian Exclusion Order No. Here, as in the Hirabayashi case, supra, 320 U.S. at page 99, 63 S.Ct. But exclusion from a threatened area, no less than curfew, has a definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage. Civilian Exclusion Order No. ', Exclusion Order No. 165. The scope of their discretion must, as a matter of necessity and common sense, be wide. & L. Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426, 54 S.Ct. The power to exclude includes the power to do it by force if necessary.
7 Fed.Reg. 1.
The report refers without identity to 'numerous incidents of violence' as well as to other admittedly unverified or cumulative incidents. And on Tuesday, Chief Justice John Roberts made it clear how the five Justice majority in Trump v. Hawaii viewed Korematsu in the canon of Supreme Court decisions. But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution. It rests on the orders of General DeWitt. 34 were of that nature the Hirabayashi case would be authority for sustaining it. Compare Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 S.Ct. ), 280—1. But when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger. Special interest groups were extremely active in applying pressure for mass evacuation. “The dissent’s reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—“has no place in law under the Constitution,” Roberts says, quoting Justice Jackson’s 1944 dissent. The orders required that if any person of Japanese, German or Italian ancestry residing in Area No.
But I would not lead people to rely on this Court for a review that seems to me wholly delusive. It is now argued that the validity of the exclusion order cannot be considered apart from the orders requiring him, after departure from the area, to report and to remain in an assembly or relocation center. I am unable to see how the legal considerations that led to the decision in Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct.
He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders—as inevitably it must—determined that they should have the power to do just this. * * * The danger of the Japanese was, and is now—if they are permitted to come back—espionage and sabotage. It is sufficient here for us to pass upon the order which petitioner violated. The use of the word 'voluntarily' exhibits a grim irony probably not lost on petitioner and others in like case.
34 ordering him to leave the area in which he resided, which was the basis of the information against him. at page 1386, 87 L.Ed. '4 They are claimed to be given to 'emperor worshipping ceremonies'5 and to 'dual citizenship. United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. All who observe the work of courts are familiar with what Judge Cardozo described as 'the tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic. of Int. A demurrer to the information having been overruled, the petitioner was tried under a plea of not guilty and convicted. 49, and Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 30 S.Ct.
They must accordingly be treated at all times as the heirs of the American experiment and as entitled to all the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. h�ԛKo�6F� '6 Japanese language schools and allegedly pro-Japanese organizations are cited as evidence of possible group disloyalty,7 together with facts as to certain persons being educated and residing at length in Japan.8 It is intimated that many of these individuals deliberately resided 'adjacent to strategic points,' thus enabling them 'to carry into execution a tremendous program of sabotage on a mass scale should any considerable number of them have been inclined to do so. 247-52. The petitioner, a resident of San Leandro, Alameda County, California, is a native of the United States of Japanese ancestry who, according to the uncontradicted evidence, is a loyal citizen of the nation. A citizen's presence in the locality, however, was made a crime only if his parents were of Japanese birth. ��J���"�"q�0���;#(\[(��ǘɿ泌I$1�o,����C:z��VFY�((����h�Xr�Q��^�F�(��D��Z��C��)*�d��ʛ���*h6�k|�d9HV�DZI��I#>*�$AK"JI`Ed�(XE��S�$�SR�#5�@MJ�bPd=I�2n�ҫ��\��$�㝑�$OI�S�I��ʘ��¤c��&�%/%�d�$��zսY=�me�ݻۛ�e����Ѐ,�w�������~st4Ծ��wۍ�@ms��d�z��%���p{ݟ�������ns���?�F��GGݟ�������K-�y�!�{�B�n������ۿ���i����?X� q�ug���[(�ur�Ӝ,qgJwg��÷A��d���q Moreover, it is beside the point to rest decision in part on the fact that the petitioner, for his own reasons, wished to remain in his home. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) was a U.S. Supreme Court case that upheld Japanese internment camps.After the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066. That 'future order', the one for violation of which petitioner was convicted, was issued May 3, 1942, and it did 'direct' exclusion from the area of all persons of Japanese ancestry, before 12 o'clock noon, May 9; furthermore it contained a warning that all such persons found in the prohibited area would be liable to punishment under the March 21, 1942 Act of Congress.
1, the territory wherein he was previously living, except within the bounds of the established Assembly Center of that area. Final Report, pp. But a judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a farm more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself. Nor is there any denial of the fact that not one person of Japanese ancestry was accused or convicted of espionage or sabotage after Pearl Harbor while they were still free,15 a fact which is some evidence of the loyalty of the vast majority of these individuals and of the effectiveness of the established methods of combatting these evils. If the Executive Order No. It would be impracticable and dangerous idealism to expect or insist that each specific military command in an area of probable operations will conform to conventional tests of constitutionality. 1774, when we sustained these orders in so far as they applied a curfew requirement to a citizen of Japanese ancestry. The Court agreed with government and stated that the need to protect the country was a greater priority than the individual rights of the Japanese and Japanese Americans. Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. Now, if any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is that guilt is personal and not inheritable.
And so I join in the opinion of the Court, but should like to add a few words of my own. We know, however, in the light of the foregoing recitation, that he was at once taken into military custody and lodged in an Assembly Center. Had Congress directly incorporated into one Act the language of these separate orders, and provided sanctions for their violations, disobedience of any one would have constituted a separate offense. 9, 17. Moreover, there was no adequate proof that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military and naval intelligence services did not have the espionage and sabotage situation well in hand during this long period. It is important to note that the order, by its express terms, had no application to persons within the bounds 'of an established Assembly Center pursuant to instructions from this Headquarters * * *.' The order required a responsible member of each family and each individual living alone to report, at a time set, at a Civil Control Station for instructions to go to an Assembly Center, and added that any person failing to comply with the provisions of the order who was found in the described area after the date set would be liable to prosecution under the Act of March 21, 1942, supra. “While two dissenting Justices praised the Court for ‘finally overruling’ that 1944 precedent, the majority did not actually do so, for several reasons,” Denniston said.
February 20, 1942, Lieutenant General DeWitt was designated Military Commander of the Western Defense Command embracing the westernmost states of the Union,—about one-fourth of the total area of the nation.
2701 and other bills to expatriate certain nationals of the United States, pp. Public Proclamation No. The civil authorities must often resort to the expedient of excluding citizens temporarily from a locality. The very essence of the military job is to marshal physical force, to remove every obstacle to its effectiveness, to give it every strategic advantage.
91, p. 8 (1944). The Court is now saying that in Hirabayashi we did decide the very things we there said we were not deciding.
In this case the petitioner challenges the assumptions upon which we rested our conclusions in the Hirabayashi case. (Italics added.). So the Court, having no real evidence before it, has no choice but to accept General DeWitt's own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any cross-examination, that what he did was reasonable. at page 1382, 87 L.Ed. I might agree with the court's disposition of the hypothetical case.8 The liberty of every American citizen freely to come and to go must frequently, in the face of sudden danger, be temporarily limited or suspended. He was on notice that his home city had been included, by Military Order, in Area No. 2124 (77th Cong., 2d Sess.