2d 36 (1989), we granted certiorari. As the Court held in Innis, however, the focus in the "functional equivalent" inquiry is on "the perceptions of the suspect," not on the officers' conduct viewed in isolation. Moreover, even were such an exception warranted, The Commonwealth argues, however, that admission of Muniz's answers to these questions does not contravene Fifth Amendment principles because Muniz's statement regarding his sixth birthday was not "testimonial" and his answers to the prior questions were not elicited by custodial interrogation. ] See, e. g., Doe v. United States, Super., at 387, 547 A. Footnote 3 , n. 15 (1983) (drawing analogy to "police request to submit to fingerprinting or photography" and holding that police inquiry whether suspect would submit to blood-alcohol test was not "interrogation within the meaning of Miranda"). 388
U.S. 291, 300 At his trial for first-degree murder, Dolan Chapple (defendant) asserted a single argument in his defense. (1966). Footnote 1 Thus, custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda includes both express questioning and words or actions that, given the officer's knowledge of any special susceptibilities of the suspect, the officer knows or reasonably should know are likely to "have . 410 Justice Byron R. White, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. (1983), we held that since submission to a blood test could itself be compelled, see Schmerber v. California, Id., at 464-465 (emphasis added).
Moreover, while performing these tests, Muniz "attempted to explain his difficulties in performing the various tasks, and often requested further clarification of the tasks he was to perform."
Muniz responded, "No, I don't.". No contracts or commitments. 19 The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed. 89-213 PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER v. INOCENCIO MUNIZ [June 18, 1990] Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice White, Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens join, concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part..
exhibit his physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have." U.S. 582, 593]
Muniz likewise might have attempted to guess the correct response to the sixth birthday question instead of attempting to calculate the date or answer "I don't know." Even if Muniz had not skipped "two," his failure to complete the count was incriminating in itself. 20, 29, 421 A. 17 In United States v. Wade, The Commonwealth does not question either conclusion. (citation omitted), that defined the operation of the Star Chamber, wherein suspects were forced to choose between revealing incriminating private thoughts and forsaking their oath by committing perjury. We carefully noted in Gilbert v. California, Requiring a suspect to reveal the physical manner in which he articulates words, like requiring him to reveal the physical properties of the sound produced by his voice, see Dionisio, supra, does not, without more, compel him to provide a "testimonial" response for purposes of the privilege. 11
] We noted in Schmerber that "there may be circumstances in which the pain, danger, or severity of an operation [or other test seeking physical evidence] would almost inevitably cause a person to prefer confession to undergoing the `search,'" Muniz was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of 75 Pa. Cons. Miranda v. Arizona, to the sixth birthday question that gave rise to the inference of such an impairment was testimonial in nature. Footnote 8 Regardless of any administrative need for the question and regardless of the officer's intent, Miranda warnings were required because the police should have known that the question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. We reached this conclusion after addressing our reasoning in Schmerber, supra, and its progeny: This definition of testimonial evidence reflects an awareness of the historical abuses against which the privilege against self-incrimination was aimed. Richard F. Maffett, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
practice questions in 1L, 2L, & 3L subjects, as well as 16,500+ case Muniz's statements were thus the product of custodial interrogation and should have been suppressed because Muniz was not first given the Miranda warnings. [496 Because Muniz finished the tests in approximately 6 minutes, the police required him to wait another 14 minutes before they asked him to submit to the breathalyzer examination.
Cf. Rhode Island v. Innis, Cancel anytime. Both the video and audio portions of the videotape were admitted into evidence at Muniz's bench trial, 459 We therefore need not decide today whether Muniz's counting (or not counting) itself was "testimonial" within the meaning of the privilege. [
Id., at 7. ] The sixth birthday question also clearly constituted custodial interrogation because it was a form of "express questioning." Id., at 389, 547 A. Officer Deyo then asked Muniz whether he understood the nature of the test and the law and whether he would like to submit to the test. No contracts or commitments.
Miranda v. Arizona, 377 Pa. Id., at 764. 5 .
U.S. 582, 586] 481 The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police."
. Muniz's performance of the sobriety tests and his refusal to take the breathalyzer examination are thus protected by the Fifth Amendment under this interpretation. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed and held that the testimony regarding Muniz’s behavior and the results of the field sobriety tests was physical in nature, not testimonial, but that the audio portion of the recording should have been suppressed. The officer then asked Muniz, "Do you know what the date was of your sixth birthday?" Accordingly, we held that protection of the privilege against self-incrimination during pretrial questioning requires application of special "procedural safeguards." I believe that privilege extends to any evidence that a person is compelled to furnish against himself. U.S. 218 U.S. 436, 468 (1964) (internal citations omitted)): "[T]he privilege is founded on `our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government . [
provides that no "person . (1956), it is evident that a suspect is "compelled . [496 1 Because the police did not apprise Muniz of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 388 , regardless of whether the question is "designed" to elicit an incriminating response. U.S. 422, 428 responses and communications were elicited before Muniz received his Miranda warnings, they should have been excluded as evidence." [ ] Under Pennsylvania law, driving under the influence of alcohol consists of driving while intoxicated to a degree "`which substantially impairs [the suspect's] judgment, or clearness of intellect, or any of the normal faculties essential to the safe operation of an automobile.'" Pursuant to their routine in such cases, App. . U.S. 291
[ , n. 5 (1966) ("A nod or head-shake is as much a `testimonial' or `communicative' act in this sense as are spoken words"); see also Braswell v. United States, an incriminating response. After offering to take the test only after waiting a couple of hours or drinking some water, Muniz ultimately refused. [ 7. U.S. 463, 470 Muniz's apparent intoxication, then, and the police's knowledge of his statements during and after the roadside tests compel the conclusion that the police should have known that their words and actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Of course, a person's refusal to incriminate himself also cannot be used against him. C-5 - C-6.
Muniz did not count at all during the walk and turn test, supporting the inference that he was unable to do so. But this characterization addresses the wrong question; that the "fact" to be inferred might be said to concern the physical status of Muniz's brain merely describes the way in which the inference is incriminating. But "without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely."
We agree with the Commonwealth's contention that Muniz's answers are not rendered inadmissible by Miranda merely because the slurred nature of his speech was incriminating. 409 The operation could not be completed. [496 Id., at 765. . Written and curated by real attorneys at Quimbee. The physical inability to articulate words in a clear manner due to "the lack of muscular coordination of his tongue and mouth," Brief for Petitioner 16, is not itself a testimonial 3731(a)(1) (1987). In my view, however, the circumstances of this case - in particular, Muniz's apparent intoxication - rendered the officers' words and actions the "functional equivalent" of express questioning U.S. 582, 602] The Court's conclusion is wrong for two reasons. Super., at 390, 547 A. 422 Muniz again failed three field sobriety tests and refused a breathalyzer test. U.S. 1032