[72] When the nation's transportation system came under attack, destroyed bridges were repaired or replaced by dirt fords, ferries, and underwater or pontoon bridges. [61], According to Budiansky, "...captured documents showed that the North Vietnamese had at least thirty to forty-five minutes' warning of 80 to 90 per cent of Rolling Thunder missions." This also helped account for the lower number of aircraft and pilot losses suffered by the navy.
In the more heavily bombed southern panhandle, entire villages moved into tunnel complexes for the duration. This exacerbated a growing lack of experienced aircrews. The Americans were shocked when six of their aircraft were shot down during the mission. [39], As part of a large attack on the Thanh Hóa Bridge on 3 April, the VPAF first appeared as two flights of four Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-17s launched from Noi Bai airbase and shot down an F-8 Crusader,[i] while losing just one of their own aircraft, written off when it landed on a river bed after running short of fuel. One American pilot described the action which followed as "looking like the end of the world. Operation Rolling Thunder several many months, over which time 643,000 tons of bombs were used and almost 900 US aircraft were lost. Drew 1986; Van Staaveren, p. 46; Tilford, p. 93. The Air Force noted that most of their air-to-air losses were due to unseen attacks from the rear, and thus the problem could be addressed through additional technology that would provide early warning of such attacks. The mission was to expend the combat operations on the ground and aerial campaigns. The South Vietnamese Air Force had unknown tonnages that had backed up to 682 missions. Fighters had only to defend a 90-degree arc in front of the strike force, SAM exposure was more limited, and coastal targets made the shorter distances of search and rescue operations more conducive to success. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History. During 1965, 97,000 North Vietnamese civilians volunteered to work full-time in repairing the damage inflicted by U.S. bombs. A key interservice issue (and one which was not solved until 1968) was the command and control arrangement in Southeast Asia. [52] Due to their influence, the Navy could not be persuaded to integrate its air operations over North Vietnam with those of the Air Force. [109] They were correct. Another 370,000–500,000 civilians worked part-time. As soon as the United States joined South Vietnam’s ongoing fight against their Communist neighbors to the north in the early 1960s, they began compiling lists of the transportation, manufacturing, and military bases most integral to the North Vietnamese defense system. The four objectives of the operation (which evolved over time) were to boost the sagging morale of the Saigon regime in the Republic of Vietnam; to persuade North Vietnam to cease its support for the communist insurgency in South Vietnam without sending ground forces into communist North Vietnam; to destroy North Vietnam's transportation system, industrial base, and air defenses; and to halt the flow of men and materiel into South Vietnam. MiG-21 intercepts of F-105 strike groups were effective in downing US aircraft or forcing them to jettison their bomb loads. [48], During the war, the Soviet Union delivered 95 SA-2 systems and 7,658 missiles to the Vietnamese. [10] Between 1957 and 1963, the U.S. found itself committed, through its acceptance of the policy of containment and belief in the domino theory, to defending South Vietnam from what it saw as expansive communist aggression. They build up networks of bombproof tunnels and shelters. The U.S strike had destroyed two worthless targets for the loss of six aircraft and five pilots[77], North Vietnam's deployment of SAMs forced American pilots to make hard choices: either approach targets at higher altitudes (to avoid anti-aircraft fire) and become prey to SAMs, or fly lower to avoid the missiles and become the target of anti-aircraft batteries. After that time, strikes that interfered with requirements for the southern battlefield were either cut back or canceled. [76], Rolling Thunder reached the last stage of its operational evolution during 1967 and 1968. [n], Once air-to-air combat began over North Vietnam, the Air Force was again found lacking. These small-scale operations were launched against the southern region of the country, where the bulk of North Vietnam's ground forces and supply dumps were located. "[62], Before Rolling Thunder even began the North Vietnamese leadership knew what was coming. First into the target areas were specialized Iron Hand flak suppression missions. It possessed the only all-weather bomber in the U.S. inventory in the new A-6 Intruder and was also responsible for the development of the F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber, which became ubiquitous during the Vietnam War. [45], On 29 June 1965, airstrikes against the North's petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) storage areas were authorized by Johnson. North Vietnam was not the target of intense bombing again for another three and half years. The MiGs made fast and devastating attacks against US formations from several directions (usually the MiG-17s performed head-on attacks and the MiG-21s attacked from the rear). The North Vietnamese signals intelligence staff of 5,000 "proved adept at exploiting traffic analysis as NSA was. Two more hours produced an operational site. [30], Although some of these restrictions were later loosened or rescinded, Johnson (with McNamara's support) kept a tight rein on the campaign, which continuously infuriated the American military commanders, right-wing members of Congress, and even some within the administration itself. Every U.S. bombing mission was preceded by an upsurge of traffic involving logistics, ordnance loading, weather flights, and aerial refueling tankers, and even if none of the content of the signals was readable, the pattern was a dead giveaway." This policy was ultimately unsuccessful. [56] The Air Force continuously opposed adapting to the war in Southeast Asia, since its leadership believed that it was an aberration that would be quickly resolved. F-4 Phantoms, using the same radio call signs, direction of approach, altitude, and speed as a typical flight of bomb-laden F-105s, lured a group of MiG-21s toward what the MiG pilots thought would be easy prey. General John W. Vogt Jr., commander of the Seventh Air Force, reported to the USAF Chief of Staff that they were losing the air war. [127], From April 1965 to November 1968, in 268 air battles conducted over North Vietnam, VPAF claimed to have shot down 244 US or RVNAF's aircraft, and they lost 85 MiGs. Tet merely served notice to the administration that the public wanted either victory or an end to the open-ended commitment of American resources and manpower.
[67][s] With the assistance of the Soviet Union, the North Vietnamese had also quickly integrated an early warning radar system of more than 200 facilities which covered the entire country, tracking incoming U.S. raids, and then coordinating SAMs, anti-aircraft batteries, and MiGs to attack them. [26][f], The first mission of the new operation was launched on 2 March against an ammunition storage area near Xom Bang. The USAF's 2nd Air Division (replaced by the Seventh Air Force on 1 April 1966) was ostensibly responsible for aerial operations over North and South Vietnam. There was a huge financial cost used in the operation that was estimated to be around $300 million in the North Vietnam and almost $900 million was the estimated amount for the US. Some sources, including Toperczer, claim two F-8s were shot down on 3 April. The civilian administration, however, never considered utilizing the big bombers (whose operations remained under the control of the Strategic Air Command) very far north of the DMZ, believing that it was too overt an escalation. [citation needed], From mid-1966 until the end of 1967, President Johnson continued to dole out sensitive targets one by one to the generals while simultaneously trying to placate the doves in Congress and within his own administration with periodic cutbacks and half-hearted peace initiatives. At the beginning of the campaign, North Vietnam possessed approximately 1,500 anti-aircraft weapons, most of which were of the light 37 and 57mm variety. On 8 April, responding to requests for peace negotiations, North Vietnamese premier, Pham Van Dong, stated that they could only begin when: the bombing was halted; the U.S. had removed all of its troops from the south; the Saigon government recognized the demands of the VC, and it was agreed that the reunification of Vietnam would be settled by the Vietnamese themselves.