we would recognize such an interest, I agree that the State's interests to the This Court disagrees with the Second Circuit's submission that ending or refusing lifesaving medical treatment "is nothing more nor less than assisted suicide.". not imply -- as petitioners and their amici worry it might -- any general "right �3e� ���6�M�f��5e,PY�m�"�P��^�Ŭ�0IEl�֯+��RZv+��)� �!� ���=��DD�A81���F\��Vl|g��пr��r�L�C�!�ˮ����a۠]��t��nވ-��b$���Ӝ� Ante, at 27-30; post, at 11 (Stevens, J., concurring New York State might as readily restrict a woman's right to choose to carry a pregnancy . In New York, as in most States, it is a crime to aid another to commit or attempt suicide, but patients may refuse even lifesaving medical treatment. VACCO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK, et al. 95-1858 and 96-110 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1996 DENNIS C. VACCO, et al., Petitioners, v. TIMOTHY E. QUILL, M.D., et al., Respondents.
Decided June 26, 1997. This provision creates no substantive rights.
1996 Winter;12(3):275-94. Brief of the Attorney General in Vacco v. Quill in the United States Supreme Court. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. With him on the briefs were Barbara Gott Billet, Solicitor General, and Daniel Smirlock and Michael S. Popkin, Assistant Attorneys General. interests,[5] and concluded that "to the extent that [New York's statutes] prohibit a physician from prescribing medications to be self-administered by a mentally competent, terminally-ill person in the final stages of his terminal illness, they are not rationally related to any legitimate state interest."
not and should not make in this case what many have viewed as the mistake ill or dying" patient who is being given food and water by artificial means . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS in The New York statutes outlawing assisted suicide neither infringe fundamental rights nor involve suspect classifications. is particularly true when suffering occurs in a life already artificially extended
of a woman in a vegetative state who was no longer competent, to permit the As the Court has made clear, the With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Waxman, Deputy Assistant.
A� 15-17. . always ", "obvious legitimate interests in preserving life, and in protecting vulnerable persons,", [u]nder the United States Constitution and the federal system it establishes, the resolution of this issue is left to the normal democratic processes within the State.". Affirmance ", New York's statutes outlawing assisting suicide affect and address matters of profound significance to all New, 521 U.S. 793, 117 S.Ct. mistakenly or under pressure.
deterioration and a loss of control of basic bodily and mental functions.
attempt suicide, but patients may refuse even lifesaving medical treatment.
that there is no generalized right to "commit suicide." 0 other treatment for the purpose of bringing about death for those who are suffering
J., recognized We hold that it does not. 95–1858.
Argued January 8, 1997—Decided June 26, 1997. .
process will not strike the proper balance between the interests of terminally 95-1858. May a State constitutionally criminalize a physician's for Respondents in No. Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony"; N.Y. when they argue that "the coming debate over the allocation of . includes a right to assistance in doing so," ante, at 18, and concludes Alaska 95-1858.
In many of IV - States' Relations . In sum, there is no need to address the question whether suffering the existence of such a right. (b) New York's reasons for recognizing and acting on the distinction between refusing treatment and assisting a suicideincluding prohibiting intentional killing and preserving life; preventing suicide; maintaining physicians' role as their patients' healers; protecting vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide toward euthanasiaare valid and important public interests that easily satisfy the constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear a rational relation to some legitimate end. � to the degree fate and medicine permit, be left to the individual.
In such circumstances, "the . Syllabus U. S. 312, 319. classifications, e. g., Washington v. Glucksberg, ante, at 719-728, and are | . v. QUILL et al. [T]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same' "), If a legislative classification or distinction, "neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold [it] so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end. Vacco v. Quill. 95-1858. v. QUILL ET AL. On their faces, neither the assisted-suicide ban nor the law permitting patients to refuse medical treatment treats anyone differently from anyone else or draws any distinctions between persons. Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for respondents. This site needs JavaScript to work properly. 95-1858 1995 U.S. Briefs 1858 October Term, 1996 December 10, 1996 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS LAURENCE H. … Find NCBI SARS-CoV-2 literature, sequence, and clinical content: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sars-cov-2/. 799-809. constitutionally individual
(and to decide whether or not to use) a prescription for life-ending medication highlights the . challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding . O'Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined in part. The Court therefore disagrees with respondents' claim that the distinction is "arbitrary" and "irrational." for Petitioners in No. an organ transplant, or some other technological advance, may well during her With an aging population and increasingly who is suffering, a death that is certain, humane, and within his own control. withdrawal of essential nutrition, hydration, respiration, kidney dialysis or In New York, as in most States, it is a crime to aid another to commit or attempt suicide, but patients may refuse even lifesaving medical treatment. In New York, as in most States, it is a crime to aid another to commit or 96-110, a Washington state case, and Vacco v. Quill, No. Just as Nancy Cruzan, when conscious, would not have been 1185, 1199 (1992). and their amici. 808-809. Cruzan's liberty acknowledged by this Court six years ago, can exist only in taken
The New York statutes outlawing case Illinois Location New York State Capitol. 67 N.Y.U. Nevada Art VII - Ratification. U.S. 262, 311 (1932)). [*]. (1997) No. judicial assist a suicide. As the Court recognizes, States are presently Oral arguments in Washington v. Glucksberg. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. Media. follows between letting a patient die and making that patient die is important, logical, rational, and well established: It comports with fundamental legal principles of causation, see, The Court therefore disagrees with respondents' claim that the distinction is "arbitrary" and "irrational.". . The court determined that, despite the assisted-suicide ban's apparent general applicability, "New York law does not treat equally all competent persons who are in the final stages of fatal illness and wish to hasten their deaths,", "those in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life-support systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such systems; but those who are similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-administering prescribed drugs. fierce competition over medical resources, if there is no protected liberty this in Cruzan, explicitly acknowledging the constitutional liberty of a "seriously Art. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. the State has not chosen a means of regulation that reasonably advances its PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1987) provides: "A person is guilty of man-slaughter in the second degree when. The Federal District Court assisted suicide neither infringe fundamental rights nor involve suspect . circumstances or to prevent mistake or abuse. . �F ��`jb b�@@X 78, 84-85 (SDNY 1994). 420, 1575 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, (617) 495-1767, PETER J. RUBIN, 2027 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.,