Furthermore, by attempting to distinguish between a container for which the police are specifically searching and a container which they come across in a car, we have provided only minimal protection for privacy and have impeded effective law enforcement. Id., at 839-840. The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained. . 2d 619, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3016, Docket Number:
[1] When Officer Coleman returned with a warrant, the apartment was searched and bags of marijuana were found there. [7] Moreover, we quoted the following paragraph from Justice Powell's opinion concurring in the judgment in the intervening case of Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981): "`[W]hen the police have probable cause to search an automobile, rather than only to search a particular container that fortuitously is located in it, the exigencies that allow the police to search the entire automobile without a warrant support the warrantless search of every container found therein. Rptr. Moreover, as I read the opinion, the Court assumes that the police could not have made a warrantless inspection of the bag before it was placed in the car. We therefore do not consider the issue here. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion. Precedential, Citations: In the years since Ross was decided, the Court has heard argument in 30 Fourth Amendment cases involving narcotics. Most important, with the exception of United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985), and Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), the Fourth Amendment cases cited by the dissent do not concern automobiles or the automobile exception.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
We now must decide the question deferred in Ross: whether the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant to open the sack in a movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search the entire car. For surely it is anomalous to prohibit a search of a briefcase while the owner is carrying it exposed on a public street yet to permit a search once the owner has placed the briefcase in the locked trunk of his car. App. See id., at 158-159. There can be no clarity in this area unless we make up our minds, and unless the principles we express comport with the actions we take. The Court reasoned in Chambers that the police could search later whenever they could have searched earlier, had they so chosen. Several blocks from the airport, they stopped the cab, arrested the passengers, seized the suitcase and, without obtaining a warrant, opened and searched it. Compare Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), with Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); compare Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), with United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). Moreover, all evidence that does exist points to the contrary conclusion. [12] Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985); New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); Oliver v. United States, together with Maine v. Thornton, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). The defendants contended that Ross was inapplicable because the agents lacked probable cause to search anything but the packages themselves and supported this contention by noting that a search of the entire vehicle never occurred. STUDY. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L. J. See Chambers v. Maroney, [399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)]. airport searches .
The Respondent, Acevedo (Respondent), was pulled over because a bag he had put in the trunk of the vehicle he was driving was suspected to contain marijuana. According to our current law, however, the police may not, on the basis of the same probable cause, take the less intrusive step of stopping the individual on the street and demanding to see the contents of his briefcase. Ante, at 580. Agreeing as I do with most of JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion and with the result he reaches, I dissent and would affirm the judgment below. In either location, if the police have probable cause, they are authorized to seize the luggage and to detain it until they obtain judicial approval for a search. The line between probable cause to search a vehicle and probable cause to search a package in that vehicle is not always clear, and separate rules that govern the two objects to be searched may enable the police to broaden their power to make warrantless searches and disserve privacy interests. [2] Although respondent now challenges this holding, we decline to second-guess the California courts, which have found probable cause.
Chadwick, 433 U. S., at 13. The facts in the record reveal that the police did not have probable cause to believe that contraband was hidden in any other part of the automobile and a search of the entire vehicle would have been without probable cause and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. The corresponding increase in convictions for nondrug offenses was 27%.
216 Cal. The first case cited by the dissent, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), however, did not involve an automobile at all. See 456 U.S., at 824; ante, at 580.
The percentage of drug cases dismissed by District Courts declined from 22.2% in 1980 to 13.8% in 1989. In Sanders, the police had probable cause to believe a suitcase contained marijuana. The Court does not attempt to identify any exigent circumstances that would justify its refusal to apply the general rule against warrantless searches. Rptr., at 25. [6] In framing the question for decision we stated: "Unlike Chadwick and Sanders, in this case police officers had probable cause to search respondent's entire vehicle."
In Chadwick, federal narcotics agents had probable cause to believe that a 200-pound double-locked footlocker contained marijuana. E to Pet. .
Police observed respondent Acevedo leave an apartment, known to contain marijuana, with a brown paper bag … Id., at 800. Thus, in a unanimous opinion that relied on both Johnson and Chadwick, Justice Stewart wrote: *602 It is too early to know how much freedom America has lost today.
The police pursued the taxi for several blocks, stopped it, found the suitcase in the trunk, and searched it. Indeed, luggage is specifically intended to safeguard the privacy of personal effects, unlike an automobile, "whose primary function is transportation." . Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
We first held that the privacy interest in luggage is "substantially greater than in an automobile."
The agents drew near the trucks, smelled marijuana, and then saw in the backs of the trucks packages wrapped in a manner that marijuana smugglers customarily employed. J. In Fourth Amendment traffic stop cases (and perhaps for all Fourth Amendment issues) the ____ is always irrelevant.
That makes no sense a priori, and in the absence of any common-law tradition supporting such a distinction, I see no reason to continue it. Ibid. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the Court extended Chadwick's rule to apply to a suitcase actually being transported in the trunk of a car. A container sitting in a vehicle is as mobile as the vehicle itself.
With him on the brief was Jan Walls Anderson. Sign up to receive the Free Law Project newsletter with tips and announcements. 456 U.S., at 821, n. 28. In Belton, however, the justification for stopping the car and arresting the driver had nothing to do with the subsequent search, which was based on the potential danger to the arresting officer. Instead, we expressly endorsed the reasoning in Chief Justice Burger's separate opinion in Sanders. See ante, at 575.
See Kamisar, supra, at 83-85.
Id., at 13, n. 7.
Our intricate body of law regarding "reasonable expectation of privacy" has been developed largely as a means of creating these exceptions, enabling a search to be denominated not a Fourth Amendment "search" and therefore not subject to the general warrant requirement. App.
The inherent mobility of the vehicle justified the immediate search without a warrant, but did not affect the scope of the search.
The warrantless search of Ross' car occurred after an informant told the police that he had seen Ross complete a drug transaction using drugs stored in the trunk of his car. Id., at 482. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)." We have noted the virtue of providing "`"clear and unequivocal" guidelines to the law enforcement profession.'"
Rptr. This Court in Ross rejected Chadwick's distinction between containers and cars.
Relying on Chadwick, it explained that "the officers had probable cause to believe marijuana would be found only in a brown lunch bag and nowhere else in the car.
could be searched without a warrant," we concluded that "prohibiting police from opening immediately a container in which the object of the search is most likely to be found and instead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle would actually exacerbate the intrusion on privacy interests." They watched as the defendant placed the suitcase in the trunk of a taxi and was driven away. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, concluded that the marijuana found in the paper bag in the car's trunk should have been suppressed. Fearing the loss of evidence, officers in a marked police car stopped him. [2] 216 Cal. Ibid. Furthermore, for what it is worth, in Ross, as here, the drugs in the trunk were contained in a brown paper bag.