(1986), we prohibited execution of prisoners who are insane. As a result, the Court cannot rely on the statutory safeguards in discounting McCleskey's evidence, for it is the very effectiveness of those safeguards that such evidence calls into question. (1976). This fear is baseless. it yields to sentiment in the apparent process of resolving doubts as to evidence. Footnote 16 While the Equal Protection Clause forbids racial discrimination, and intent may be critical in a successful claim under that provision, the Eighth Amendment has its own distinct focus: whether punishment comports with social standards of rationality and decency. In its broadest form, McCleskey's claim of discrimination extends to every actor in the Georgia capital sentencing process, from the prosecutor who sought the death penalty and the jury that imposed the sentence, to the State itself that enacted the capital punishment statute and allows it to remain in effect despite its allegedly discriminatory application.
U.S. 279, 335]. U.S. 254 As JUSTICE WHITE stated for the plurality in Turner v. Murray, I find "the risk that racial prejudice may Since Furman v. Georgia,
(1880). He does not, however, expressly call for the overruling of any prior decision.
Solem v. Helm, [481 (1986) (argued Feb. 25, 1987) (presenting the questions whether Jews and Arabs, respectively, are "races" covered by 42 U.S.C. 6 As with sentencing, therefore, peremptory challenges are justified as an occasion for particularized determinations related to specific individuals, and, as with sentencing, we presume that such challenges normally are not made on the basis of a factor such as race. U.S. 370, 394 Moreover, because the discrepancy between borderline cases would be difficult to explain, the system would likely remain open to challenge on the basis that the lack of explanation rendered the sentencing decisions unconstitutionally arbitrary. (1983). It is tempting to pretend that minorities on death row share a fate in no way connected to our own, that our treatment of them sounds no echoes beyond the chambers in which they die. In light of our precedents under the Eighth Amendment, McCleskey cannot argue successfully that his sentence is "disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense." McCLESKEY v. KEMP, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) 481 U.S. 279 Decided April 22, 1987. that we look beyond the face of the statute . 54. See e. g., Castaneda v. Partida, supra; Bazemore v. Friday, U.S., at 519 Under the Florida capital punishment system at issue in Proffitt, the jury's verdict is only advisory. . (It was named one of the worst modern Supreme Court decisions by many sources: see, e.g., “roundups” of worse cases here and here. U.S. 586 [481 This description matched the description of the gun that McCleskey had carried during the robbery. Moreover, absent far stronger proof, it is unnecessary 4. If a grant of relief to him were to lead to a closer examination of the effects of racial considerations throughout the criminal justice system, the system, and hence society, might benefit. Second, States cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the penalty. Of course, "the power to be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate," K. Davis, Discretionary Justice 170 (1973), but a capital punishment system that did not allow for discretionary acts of leniency "would be totally alien to our notions of criminal justice." 478 470 J. Rather, relying on the Baldus study, JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICES MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, questions the very heart of our criminal justice system: the traditional discretion that prosecutors and juries necessarily must have. in Caldwell v. Mississippi, U.S. 222, 228 Furthermore, blacks who kill whites are sentenced to death at nearly 22 times the rate of blacks who kill blacks, and more than 7 times the rate of whites who kill blacks. Under Georgia law, the jury could not consider imposing the death penalty unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was accompanied by one of the statutory aggravating circumstances. It finds no fault in a system in which lawyers must tell their clients that race casts a large shadow on the capital sentencing process. (1984); Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443 (CA11 1983) (per curiam), cert. McCleskey established that the race of the victim is an especially significant factor at the point where the defendant has been convicted of murder and the prosecutor must choose whether to proceed to the penalty phase of the trial and create the possibility that a death sentence may be imposed or to accept the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment. U.S., at 519 However, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., the Court ruled against McCleskey. U.S., at 494 The Court invalidated a statute that permitted a prosecutor to eliminate prospective jurors by challenging all who expressed qualms about the death penalty.
[481 405 ] Although the Court states that it assumes the validity of the Baldus study for purposes of its analysis, because of its detailed discussion of the District Court's reasons for rejecting its validity I am compelled to record my disagreement with the District Court's reasoning. -999. Ante, at 312. Coppedge v. United States, Rather, McCleskey argues that application of the State's statute has created a classification that is "an irrational exercise of governmental power," Brief for Petitioner 41, because it is not "necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective."
Footnote 7 Prosecutors undoubtedly need adequate discretion to allocate the resources of their offices and to fulfill their responsibilities to the public in deciding how best to enforce the law, but this does not place them beyond the constraints imposed on state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2d 262 (1987) Brief Fact Summary.
450 (1980) (POWELL, J., dissenting). [ McCleskey v. Zant, No. U.S. 279, 334] See id., at 292 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 4, 4220. Subsequently, the Court recognized that the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." [ 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 13.2(a), p. 160 (1984). He does not deny that he committed a murder in the course of a planned robbery, a crime for which this Court has determined that the death penalty constitutionally may be imposed. There appears to be no reason why a white defendant in such a city could not make a claim similar to McCleskey's if racial disparities in sentencing arguably are shown by a statistical study. The Baldus study demonstrates that black persons are a distinct group that are singled out for different treatment in the Georgia capital sentencing system. The State did not test its hypothesis to determine if white-victim and black-victim cases at the same level of aggravating circumstances were similarly treated. Slaton explained that as far as he knew, he was the only one aware of this checking. The Court observes that "[t]he Gregg-type statute imposes unprecedented safeguards in the special context of capital punishment," which "ensure a degree of care in the imposition of the death penalty that can be described only as unique." [481 (1971) The Supreme Court decision that established that aid to church-related schools must (1) have a secular legislative purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. It hardly needs reiteration that this Court has consistently acknowledged the uniqueness of the punishment of death. [481 We did not ask whether the death sentences in the cases before us could have reflected the jury's rational consideration and rejection of mitigating factors.
See Wayte v. United States, U.S. 438, 449 (1969) The case in which the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on radio and television broadcasting. 1-16. Such an illusion is ultimately corrosive, for the reverberations of injustice are not so easily confined. 408 McCleskey's evidence Second, McCleskey's arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies. (1976), we invalidated a mandatory capital sentencing system, finding that the "respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." ] The Court recently explained: "In deciding if the defendant has carried his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake `a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.' [481 47. In Gregg, the Court specifically addressed the question left open in Furman - whether the punishment of death for murder is "under all circumstances, `cruel and unusual' in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution." U.S. 248, 255 Unauthorized use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this blog’s author and/or owner is strictly prohibited. . 463 430 U.S. 586, 602 The majority disregarded the calculus of Batson v. Kemp and proceeded with a conceptual analysis that would make it impossible for McCleskey to satisfy his burden. U.S. 238 (1986). .